This article examines why legislators reverse their positions on foreign policy bills they initially endorse. Using roll-call data from the U.S. House of Representatives (1990–2024), we identify systematic variations in waffling patterns across foreign policy domains. Our analysis shows that majority party members are generally less likely to waffle than their minority party counterparts, especially in defense/security and international affairs, though the pattern is less pronounced in trade policy. We also find that ideological extremity substantially increases the likelihood of waffling, particularly among senior legislators. Moreover, we distinguish between waffling and strategic waffling, revealing a distinct pattern in trade policy, where majority party members are more inclined to be absent strategically. Taken together, these findings demonstrate that legislative position-taking on foreign policy is shaped by the interplay of party pressure, ideological commitments, and political experience in the post–Cold War era.
Kang et al. (Thu,) studied this question.