Abstract People in organizations bypass safety rules, and commit theft, and other deviant acts. Is deviance in organizations primarily driven by self-interest, or do organizational factors play role? And is punishment the best strategy for dealing with it? This article addresses these questions focusing on a specific type of organizational deviance—rule violations. While rule violations are often explained using individual-level mechanisms, including character deficiencies, this article argues that violations are inevitable when there is decoupling between means and ends, between formal rules and the actual performance requirements placed on operators. The article analyzes two case studies selected from very different organizational contexts – rail transport maintenance and career promotions in the judicial system – to inductively develop a general theory that explains a particular type of violations in organizations. From the research it emerges that violations in organizations are favored (1) by the degree of decoupling between an organization’s internal and external rules and the tasks to be carried out; and (2) by executors’ attitude (favorable or unfavorable) towards the norms. When formal governance in an organization fails to meet its objectives, an alternative, self-organized extralegal governance emerges to achieve the same goals through different, non-lawful methods. In such cases, punishment by itself is insufficient to reduce deviance. Rather, reducing means–ends decoupling requires enhancing the alignment of rules with established practices and strengthening consensus over the relevant norms.
Maurizio Catino (Fri,) studied this question.