This article offers a new perspective on Sino–Soviet relations in the mid-1930s by examining how Chiang Kai-shek strategically reshaped Soviet perceptions of his political stance. Against the background that the Nanjing government was pursuing rapprochement with Japan, Chiang recast himself in Soviet eyes from a pro-Japanese leader to a potential anti-Japanese ally. He achieved this by exploiting the fragmented appearance of authority within the Nanjing government, distancing himself from the conciliatory policies towards Japan, and aligning with Soviet interests on key issues such as Xinjiang. Despite actually holding ultimate decision-making power of the Nanjing government, Chiang took advantage of the institutional ambiguity to attribute pro-Japanese policies to Wang Jingwei, President of the Executive Yuan and Minister of Foreign Affairs, and other civilian officials. This case study highlights the need to reconsider how foreign relations functioned in Republican China, not only as state-to-state diplomacy between unified actors but as complex interactions shaped by internal divisions and diplomatic manoeuvring. By examining how foreign powers interpreted and responded to China's internal political structure, the article also provides broader insights into the role of strategic ambiguity and perception in international relations.
Zhixia Jin (Thu,) studied this question.