This paper articulates the Law of Epistemic Warrant: a constitutive, agent-general procedural law governing how epistemic warrant can arise for any finite conscious agent. The law does not function as a theory within epistemology, nor as a deductive argument for knowledge. Instead, it describes the necessary structural conditions that must be jointly instantiated for warrant-seeking inquiry to succeed at all. These conditions are expressed by the PIE Sequence (mnemonic: Perception, Inquiry, Experimentation) which specifies how epistemic instability arises, how inquiry is normatively directed, and how warrant is procedurally resolved across distinct domains. The law yields exactly two non-arbitrary forms of epistemic warrant—Justified Coherent Belief (JCB) for intrinsic claims and Justified Reliable Belief (JRB) for extrinsic claims. By relocating epistemic warrant from propositional justification to procedural resolution, the law dissolves Agrippa’s Trilemma, which applies only to belief-justification frameworks. The persistence of Gettier-style problems is likewise explained as a structural consequence of attempting to force propositional truth conditions onto a domain governed by procedural warrant.
Lucas Gage (Wed,) studied this question.