In December 1952, Otto Lehner, a Swiss delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in charge of the mission in South Korea, visited camps holding North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war (POWs). His report detailed several alleged acts of abuse perpetrated against prisoners in U.S. captivity. Lehner said that when he questioned camp authorities about the use of force, a U.S. junior officer supposedly claimed, “We never torture POWs, but we question them sometimes until they scream.”1 Seizing on this alleged statement, Lehner accused the U.S. military of failing to comply with the 1949 Geneva Conventions. In response, the U.S.-led United Nations Command (UNC) publicly denounced the finding but, at the same time, affirmed during internal meetings that, given the importance of the intelligence effort in the war against Communist aggression, a degree of harsh treatment of captives was justified. The UNC also declared, however, that observance of the Geneva Conventions remained a priority in the handling of enemy captives.2 Although the urgency of gaining wartime intelligence might seem at odds with the requirements of the Geneva Convention, both goals represented major elements of U.S. detention policies for North Korean and Chinese POWs during the Korean War. To understand the modus operandi of the war captivity policy established by the UNC, it is essential to examine these two aspects.The fate of the 170,000 North Korean and Chinese POWs captured during the Korean conflict has received sustained attention in the historiography of the “Forgotten War.” This is partly explained by the centrality of POWs in the armistice negotiations involving the United Nations, North Korea, and China.3 In particular, the issue of the “voluntary repatriation” of POWs in 1951–1953 and the violence stemming from this policy in UN camps has earned significant attention. Scholars have examined the ideological struggle between Communist and anti-Communist captives and the impact of the educational program created by the UNC on the captivity operations.4 Examining war captivity operations in Korea, historians have questioned how far Communism influenced prisoners’ behavior and thus explained their wishes to be repatriated.5 Scholars of the Korean War have shown that the revolts and difficulties in POW camps were caused by tensions and violent confrontations between Communist and anti-Communist elements. Explanations of the handling of war captivity, along with problems encountered by the UNC regarding enemy POWs, have been principally examined through the ideological dynamic of the Cold War.6 Recently, David Cheng Chang and Monica Kim have connected the harsh conditions of detention of North Korean and Chinese captives with the U.S. repatriation policy. Kim argues that the repatriation of POWs must be primarily understood through the prism of the U.S. decolonization project in Asia, whereas Chang alleges the complete failure of the “ambivalent and improvised” U.S. POW policy, which caused particularly violent conditions for Chinese prisoners.7This article contributes to the literature on the treatment of North Korean and Chinese POWs in U.S. captivity by exploring the interaction of two imperatives: the needs of intelligence and the application of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. To explain the coercion used by U.S. military authorities against enemy POWs, this article explores the relationship between the UNC's commitment to respect the Geneva Conventions, and therefore to cooperate with the ICRC, and the exigencies of U.S. intelligence operations against Communism. The term “intelligence” refers here to the substantial amount of data produced by military officers regarding POWs for purposes of intelligence, counterintelligence, political and psychological warfare, propaganda projects, and cultural diplomacy. The presence of more than 100,000 enemy soldiers in UN compounds served as the main source for Korea's other major military-funded behavioral analyses of the enemy. As Kim, Chang, and Robin have noted, there was an “urgency and in the U.S. authorities for cultural and political was in captivity these operations were primarily for the and of the program and for their impact on the conditions of article a on the issue by on how U.S. military authorities use of intelligence in their of captivity. The article that in to with the Geneva Conventions, the treatment of enemy captives and their conditions of detention were by the UNC to on Communist soldiers for that Communist POWs of the U.S. officers that prisoners were The of the enemy as a and an a of detention The article the the U.S. military between the of to the for intelligence, and the of the Geneva here the and of the ICRC, which was the by the the conditions of captivity, the of the UNC enemy and the U.S. officers policies in of and intelligence internal produced by Red Cross that U.S. officers and in and were of the of POWs and the of violence in The that the camp were by the U.S. military thus to be by the mission in during meetings with U.S. officers and in by intelligence but also the UNC's POW policy in with the Geneva with the was as a priority by military authorities when their to respect were by the and by the regarding the treatment of POWs in South and to impact on for this the relationship between the and the UNC an impact on the conditions of detention and the UNC's respect of The in the is essential to we to understand the captivity of North Korean and Chinese The and produced by U.S. military authorities on the of war captivity in South during the Korean conflict and the treatment of enemy POWs on a by the the captivity policies were and by military authorities in with the Geneva but also for the of the Communist and their the of on the Korean when soldiers of the North Korean the South Korean to the two Communist in to North Korea's military aggression, the UN in of an to the Communist The UNC, U.S. was of from a military the conflict in the from to the two of the the North Korean South Korean to the of The by the of UN at the of on and the of the Communist the UNC to the the in North in in to the of UN to the Korean in the Chinese the to against the North Korean by their Communist UN were to to South The a of and by the UN and Communist the the and the conflict a war of with of the until the of the armistice in of North Korean and Chinese POWs were captured by the UNC during the of the enemy prisoners were were to when South Korean the UN and the the of POWs in the of the UNC from in to in in the of the the of POWs UN in prisoners were in and as of a the armistice was The of enemy POWs the UNC to a of camps to the captives and to policy of how to the UNC in for enemy prisoners to the of the U.S. in and POW Although U.S. officers the treatment of POWs, the UN was the The of the 1949 Geneva were in the UNC's captivity policy. military operations in U.S. in of the UNC, and South Korean that UN by the of the 1949 in to the treatment of however, a of this in The of caused in the Scholars have the of the Korean War from the of of of of war and conflict involving several and the United North Korea, and the of the 1949 Geneva Conventions at the of the This a of the 1949 by military officers in charge of there was with North and which the presence of on their Geneva Conventions that the as a for were for the application of by conditions in and to and and and for captivity. also to their with U.S. military authorities in regarding the and of the Geneva Conventions by the UNC were in Geneva to be by and the of the Red in and were in charge of the of the effort through and with UNC and the POW were particularly during the war in of and between the and the UNC's to the 1949 was by as as the of POWs, respect for was a of anti-Communist propaganda and political U.S. that with the was essential to an ideological the Communist enemy. the to a of the UNC's detention and they also that a of with in of the UN in with the ICRC, the in Korea, the UNC's to the of to by war and from with the Geneva Convention, the UNC a of War to about the In officers that camps be in the of the Korean to prisoners from and military Although the of POWs to the United was the UNC that camps be on the of and The of camps was in in to the of POWs in and The and of the camp given the of to as The use of the South Korean in the camps for intelligence, and was therefore to the U.S. authorities remained in charge of the a and were camp to explain the of the Geneva Conventions to South Korean and to the importance of prisoners in with was in the and to camp the of the on the conditions of UN camps were on the treatment of the given the for detention operations the 1949 and for the prisoners were to of the South Korean The conditions of the of and were were by the U.S. to of the and and the of their the of the significant in the of the that UN camps were and UNC officers that with the were of and they were that in the of the of Chinese U.S. the of camps in which and conditions To at the UNC that the of the POWs to be to a camp established at The camp was compounds with operations as of and by the prisoners U.S. and South Korean were primarily with this camp was to be the of the captivity by the of a in detention was by U.S. military officers in with the Geneva but also to ideological the officers at the UNC were by intelligence the of elements enemy the of the detention in South Korea, UNC military intelligence The was to on the of Communist prisoners in to it and for psychological and political operations in enemy the of their political and the impact of these on their behavior as Robin the importance of as a in and to behavioral for in enemy U.S. was also of this the in with these U.S. intelligence officers captives and and that might be with Communism. that prisoners the of Chinese in the conflict as an of from U.S. in in their conditions of U.S. and that North were to intelligence, that Communist was the camps and more officers and by of these that POWs might in also to anti-Communist elements of anti-Communist that Communist in compounds and acts of and that Communist prisoners to and camp and by a of about the conditions of detention and by against camp authorities anti-Communist intelligence served by about the North Korean these U.S. military authorities a program with the of the and by the The program and a and and for on prisoners’ a significant on U.S. military for the handling of captivity. a of officers of the POW Command that the major problems with POWs were to conditions several to be on but to psychological on by the violent and behavior of Communist Otto Lehner that the main in camps was to the South Korean and violent and on and from prisoners of In to these the UNC from the of South and that the conditions in camps and of and in Korean in were in with the Geneva the same time, the UNC and officers to an This remained The ideological struggle prisoners and the of violence in compounds it to of abuse from Communist that and were and that captives camp authorities by Communist and by and of violence in POW camps was particularly of the of the Korean War both from the and the UNC a conflict between Communist and anti-Communist POWs the As has the Korean War was a war but also a conflict that from the Chinese is that of the Chinese to in on the in the Chinese war and been captured in the war to the Communist of these far from to the Chinese Communist and a substantial that they to be to Korean POWs in the UN camps also been with North Korean against their and to in South was that a of war between and the Korean and Chinese POWs was in the with violence by both against UNC intelligence and other violence by Communist POWs the to by Communist prisoners against the camp created a of was on the U.S. officers alleged that Communist prisoners and Communist propaganda for the violence in This was by intelligence the presence of and the of the POW camps as an of the and that prisoners were the the The to the enemy from the camps tensions at the UNC, of of there were South for of to of violence was the between POWs and This was with captured by UN and South Korean Communist in South Korea, been with North Korean and of the North Korean U.S. military authorities were to to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, but this commitment to the with POWs, the the between POWs and was POWs in camps in South in were as and substantial of were in camps by the South Korean authorities than the U.S. The question of the and treatment of was also a significant of violence in prisoners their and to be as a POW a violent confrontations with and their issue between the and U.S. military for was the of the Red Cross in Korea, and to of the was by the harsh treatment and conditions he at these that South Korean North Korean and Chinese and and they were and from the in and The UNC it for these of their the to the South Korean to camps to by December that the to the UNC also that the Red Cross on POW the UNC by the 1949 Geneva with prisoners of In the issue of remained for the of the about South Korean and both the United and the UN an on the treatment of which to the ideological struggle in the the UNC and major the repatriation of in of the captives to be to their the to in South in the of Chinese to be in This was the Geneva Conventions that prisoners must be at the of The of POWs the major issue during the for a with Communist The UN the U.S. of repatriation of which caused the of negotiations with North and the and the when the Communist there repatriation of repatriation policy and the failure of negotiations in and a major impact in the tensions between prisoners and at The and between the captives and revolts and against camp violent were in the of denounced against of Communist and operations for the confrontations in and the to the UNC and the was and a particularly violent on 1952, were and U.S. also on 1952, when captives and were and a on there were and a in In to a violent against at the military of camp a of Communist POWs in the of the was until of In to this the UN violent the in that of prisoners for repatriation and prisoners as be in in the of 1952, camp was compounds of with Communist and anti-Communist elements and the of U.S. This of Communist in and the of the U.S. and is This a major impact on UNC policy as it to UNC officers the by Communist was to intelligence The was also as the of a to of was a in the UNC's captivity policy. The was the UN mission in a The to the military authorities the of represented by the the UNC to to prisoners to in the The of and in camps the priority to violent In the the importance of intelligence in the of POW a priority for camp officers to for the of and violent of the U.S. in camps to during and to with the operations of Communist and anti-Communist in of the UNC 1952, and of an to and of Communist prisoners in The policy officers to POWs to their political and to of Communist against camp The policy to use is to captives and to this was a to the of captivity and that the UNC in the of the and he as of the Geneva the of in must be to of violence and of the and in the use of against POWs, the of and and with to use and importance of with the Geneva Conventions was in UNC captivity This was to camp U.S. to a relationship with the ICRC, meetings and their with and to The UNC that the presence of in camps be in tensions and in a of UN The United that an delegate be at to the camp the that an to the mission in South Korea, the UNC was to for to use against POWs and thus regarding UNC captivity on the violence involving POWs 1952, Otto Lehner and remained of U.S. to Lehner, military authorities to the of POWs and them an and that a of the prisoners to tensions in the In U.S. for the North Korean and Chinese be they to their regarding the Geneva Conventions and effort to and cultural To he for treatment of enemy POWs the of their that the Geneva Conventions were for The use of as and were in the UNC's to the of was as a the military that their and POWs been by and a that was the military the to the an use of to the to use their to they also at POWs with harsh U.S. a between Lehner and from the was particularly The of and that Red Cross the for detention to and and in a that the violence was caused by Communist Although and detention were in with the Geneva Conventions, the UNC was a as in intelligence the use of was justified. The in the of this in the understand that the U.S. officers to in camps also the of the Geneva Conventions. The UNC to the the camps the treatment of POWs, which have an impact on the treatment of U.S. prisoners in enemy and the negotiations with North was that the and in the camps the priority for U.S. of and in by intelligence the UNC's on Communist prisoners with the Lehner to detention policies in the whereas the UNC with prisoners to of the to U.S. prisoners been of the and by camp which them to was by intelligence that the understand but The that this policy, and the use of against remained the Geneva but also to the in the the UNC's to the conditions in tensions between prisoners and the authorities in anti-Communist camps were by the of 1952, but the in compounds for Communist at to to intelligence Communist elements and other POWs by propaganda and officers that Communist POWs to violent in camps as a political to and the were by confrontations between and acts of perpetrated by political and by during and and by the UNC to policies the of the to in the In December 1952, Chinese captives were and during the of an at the POWs were and during at In both U.S. authorities to have to the but their the prisoners were and The thus but to use UNC officers prisoners to understand that to be also the of intelligence to be these with the UNC in were of that U.S. to prisoners in used as and The questioned for the use of a the was to an the prisoners of the for an of the Red Cross far as to these with the to used by authorities in camps during the to an against prisoners accused of is to be to be as he a to these of the POW Command that prisoners were for the they an for and the complete of that were in Korean and that the were of the Geneva Conventions. that and conditions the that the priority was to of the by of the camps through was that in the camps to Communist POWs, given their and he the Geneva Conventions they were used in U.S. and were thus of detention to be against that the of was and that the they that they their mission of and with the UNC the that camp be to as a internal at the UNC, the was that the by the and the by U.S. officers be by the and that was in Communist the violence in a U.S. officer that there were for the UNC to them for a and the that it was to attention to in to and propaganda and that U.S. must that their policies POWs were in with the of the Geneva the same time, the UNC of the by the UNC officers that the of the and the of prisoners were to internal in camps been to the of the U.S. officers questioned that he been during alleged that on and POWs in War U.S. authorities and policies in of the captives and with the been accused of and regarding detention operations in This time, officers the to with a delegate of with prisoners with the of Korean that a might problems between and the UNC to the of internal and UNC of the of their and to internal camp authorities of and attention to in and policies and in the of and the of camp an in of and of the and has more been than was to the of and The how prisoners’ thus the for problems captivity. The that was and that Communist prisoners to to the UNC that the POWs were for the the of as in the of that the by the UNC The of by camp authorities the prisoners from UNC officers were that their captivity policies were the of the to the ICRC, violent by the UNC were the of major confrontations the POW were by the and in a of in the the other as the use of a and to were as acts by U.S. the of as that by the UNC camp authorities to the of by by as a a on the The was that this Communist propaganda and the from these the of 1952, the UNC's regarding the captivity of enemy prisoners was influenced by intelligence the of in was to the as of the of Communist prisoners for the use of in camps by U.S. that Communist captives were a of POW with and of their ideological and violent against and anti-Communist captives in to the between the problems in the camps and the Communist of the be here that these at in their of have been the source of the major difficulties of the POW As by these the POW was a political by in North and in This of enemy POWs remained until the of the the of major in POW camps in South to intelligence their operations in compounds to this by the for a policy to a also that intelligence was in that the UNC Communist that the of was To this in camps to be in intelligence and the to on POWs and the of cultural for use in political on the intelligence an for the of and in POW the and of Communist from other the of captives from to and to Communist propaganda by and an in and of to POWs from the camp POWs were from in the camp and the UNC in the compounds to prisoners and their the in violence in POW tensions between Communist elements and authorities were Although confrontations in and of POW from the Korean that of with and he from and in than in to that the use of of been with of prisoners The of intelligence was a priority in of the of officers to operations in the Communist that officers were in in POW camps and use of use of intelligence to the in the the of major in camps by the of violence and the Red Cross an in conditions the of camp and the UNC to to the and with the Red Cross were that, the of a policy, U.S. soldiers more in their Communist of abuse were in the The behavior of the been accused of the abuse by a Lehner that the problems in the camps were connected with a of perpetrated and against the and to and of The of however, as POWs and as soldiers on the In other they of the UNC by was to in policies both POWs and Although violent in the the UNC with the Red Cross by military the of in and meetings with during an at camp in on and were to the camp and to UN UNC internal the for these was to the Communist of the the remained that the and political the of handling Communist was during of camps in and problems and conditions at the main remained the Communist he were this The produced by U.S. intelligence to the by Communist captives and the presence of elements in the In particular, the of prisoners and their to against their that UNC detention policies were justified. shown that and intelligence were the to Communist of Communist POWs remained to UNC policies until the of the the of the armistice in which the repatriation of POWs, Lehner that several camp officers violence captives and that several used their as a to the of Communist U.S. on the of POWs for a and policy. Lehner that military that the were in to them to the by the Geneva Conventions. UNC that the represented an of treatment to in the of Communist and that the to the to respect in the Communist prisoners they were to the by the South Korean of the by the of that the of of and that of violence were and of however, caused problems for the in the to be questioned by a repatriation a significant of prisoners and a to more than as from camps with the of the South Korean which was to these Korean with at from the United As by Monica Kim, the of the South in harsh treatment of POWs was also in with the of the that compounds and confrontations with North intelligence that the of Communist which the U.S. military to to enemy the of the POWs as with the application of a on the policies the Korean U.S. military authorities were influenced by by intelligence about the presence of and and the of Communism in POW to the U.S. treatment of and elements the POWs and to harsh and policies to Although Communist in the U.S. of UNC used intelligence on prisoners’ and to that the for with the to U.S. intelligence, Communist the POW camp as an of the which that soldiers enemy must to from as This however, with the UNC's to respect the Geneva Conventions and with the of in in the that with the Geneva Conventions Communist of a against Communism was to the Geneva we have to the of a war in which military operations on the POW for propaganda purposes and for Communist captives the Geneva Convention, it is that the UNC a far policy in camps by with of for prisoners and with Communist UNC to comply with the Geneva Conventions and cooperate with the ICRC, intelligence also a significant on the policies The harsh treatment of POWs was partly the of intelligence that the Communist prisoners were in their commitment to the war in the camps and that the to was to and sometimes the by As by the ICRC, the main problems in the camps and the UNC's policies were the but more the psychological and ideological The that prisoners must respect but intelligence that the captives the in behavior of the prisoners is to of how POWs To a and in the South Korean both the and the POWs to a degree of this was war captivity of for 1952, the UNC's policy on and in the camps was a priority for military the relationship between Communist and anti-Communist POWs, in through intelligence and in through the same time, the of to the of Communist The UNC that a was U.S. military officers the of in the camps that their elements was these to military UNC to enemy POWs they to the of the Geneva Conventions and to with the ICRC, when to in In to comply with the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Communist POWs, the UNC's policies the of to and for their and on of this to the and of the of Cold War for their and on the
Jean-Michel Turcotte (Wed,) studied this question.