Animal Politics Without Moral Foundations?

Can we arrive at convincing norms for the political regulation of human–animal relations without first clarifying the moral status of animals? Are such norms inherent in the political context itself, so that we can uncover them without having to descend into the moral–philosophical depths of animal ethics? Three such approaches of animal politics without moral foundations are discussed. Robert Garner presents the all-affected principle as an alternative to an appeal to contentious non-political moral arguments. Peter Niesen argues in favor of a “freestanding” political conception by following the route of practice-dependent theorists who try to reconstruct ideas or norms as inherent in political institutions. Federico Zuolo sees the deep differences in views about the moral status of animals as an epistemological problem that excludes a legitimate animal politics that is directly based on morality. I try to show that each of these approaches fails. This negative result suggets that we need a two-stage approach according to which the moral status of animals must first be determined in order to arrive at sufficiently contentful and also critical norms of animal politics in a second step.