Systemic risk in banking systems arises from losses transmitted through networks of contractual exposures. Yet, most widely used measures rely on market-implied volatility and equity prices rather than structural balance sheet fragilities. This paper develops a flow network framework that models systemic risk as a capacity-constrained loss-diffusion process governed by flow conservation, contractual seniority, and interbank topology. Using regulatory balance sheet data for four major U.S. banks across six quarters of the 2007–2008 financial crisis, we simulate millions of unit-consistent cascade scenarios to characterize the distribution of bank failures and aggregate losses. Despite severe macro-financial stress, the system remains in a subcritical contagion regime, exhibiting frequent single-bank failures, virtually no multi-bank cascades, and quasi-stationary aggregate losses concentrated around USD 420–430B.We extend the model to a stochastic setting in which the initial shock magnitude is randomized while propagation mechanics remain deterministic. The resulting loss distribution remains tightly concentrated and scales approximately linearly with shock size, suggesting that uncertainty in shock realizations does not induce nonlinear cascade amplification. Applying an efficient network benchmark, we estimate that 10–23% of expected systemic loss is attributable to suboptimal network architecture, implying potential gains from structural policy intervention. A comparison with SRISK reveals early divergence and convergence only at peak stress, highlighting the complementary roles of structural and market-based systemic risk measures. Finally, a graph neural network trained on synthetic flow network data fails to reproduce threshold-driven cascade dynamics, underscoring the importance of considering network structures vis-à-vis data-driven approaches.
Jacquez et al. (Thu,) studied this question.