A Neo-Kohlbergian Approach to Morality Research

ABSTRACT Kohlberg’s work in moral judgement has been criticised by many philosophers and psychologists. Building on Kohlberg’s core assumptions, we propose a model of moral judgement (hereafter the neo-Kohlbergian approach) that addresses these concerns. Using 25 years of data gathered with the De � ning Issues Test (DIT), we present an overview of Minnesota’s neo-Kohlbergian approach, using Kohlberg’s basic starting points, ideas from Cognitive Science (especially schema theory), and developments in moral philosophy. Kohlberg’s Legacy Foremost in Larry Kohlberg’s legacy is his modelling of openness to new developments and possibilities. When he was � rst formulating his theory of moral development, the work of Jean Piaget was coming to the attention of American psychologists (e.g. Flavell, 1963), and the work of John Rawls in moral philosophy (1971) was recognised as a new way for moral philosophy to say something signi � cant (beyond clarifying moral language) about normative ethics. Kohlberg’s fusion of Piaget and Rawls excited many researchers because of its interdisciplinary approach (taking seriously the questions and contributions of developmental psychology and of normative ethics), and because it addressed issues of the day (e.g. what is social justice?). Recall that in the 1960s and 1970s the US Civil Rights movement, the Vietnam War and the Watergate Scandal were all controversial issues that divided