One dimension of the Russo–Ukrainian war is the confrontation between authoritarianism and democracy in economic matters. Ukraine is currently engaged in a dynamic process of establishing the democratic legitimacy of public authority. This legitimacy requires public authorities to be economically efficient. This means that public authorities in Ukraine must ensure institutional stability and deliver effective governance. The legitimacy of public authority is a significant factor in achieving victory in wartime. The Russo–Ukrainian war is a convincing example of how resource mobilisation in wartime can only be achieved through societal unity and trust-based relations between the government and its citizens. Institutional trust arises from economic efficiency. War creates a situation that requires the stability of public institutions, as well as the ability to demonstrate economic effectiveness, mobilise resources, maintain public trust and ensure effective strategic management. Theoretical models of legitimacy, both classical and contemporary, need to be reconsidered in light of the specific economic processes that occur during wartime. Political democracy must be complemented by economic democracy. In wartime, the legitimacy of public authority is based on trust in key institutions such as the president, the government and parliament. While the government may resort to restricting certain democratic procedures in wartime (such as media censorship, banning threatening political parties and suspending elections), this should not undermine the fundamental principles of democracy and the rule of law. This article aims to determine the legitimacy of public authority under wartime conditions by examining the relationship between institutional trust and government economic performance. The focus of this paper is to define the economic efficiency of public authorities as the basis for their legitimacy and the trust placed in them during wartime. In the months following the outbreak of the Russo–Ukrainian war, public trust in most government institutions increased. This was driven by a recognition of the need for national unity in the face of an external threat. However, the level of trust in state institutions has declined over time compared to the first year of the war. While trust in many institutions remains higher than before the war, high levels of trust are primarily reserved for those directly responsible for the country’s defence, such as the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the National Guard, the State Border Guard Service and the Security Service of Ukraine. Trust in the President is higher than before the war, which is linked to his role as Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Trust in volunteer organisations and civil society, as well as in the banking system, has also increased since the war. Sociological studies consistently reveal an imbalance in institutional trust: the highest levels are found in the defence and security sector (the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the State Emergency Service, and volunteer organisations and defence formations), while political institutions of representation and governance (political parties, parliament, the government, the bureaucracy and the judiciary) are subject to chronic distrust. Between 2025 and early 2026, Ukrainian society will prioritise the state's economic effectiveness over electoral legitimacy.
Yakovleva et al. (Mon,) studied this question.