Bangladesh’s caretaker government (CTG) system has historically functioned as a pragmatic institutional innovation to address electoral mistrust and partisan polarization. Introduced formally through the Thirteenth Amendment in 1996, the system oversaw several election cycles before its abolition in 2011 via the Fifteenth Amendment. Yet, the formation of a new caretaker government in 2024 under Muhammad Yunus, following mass student-led uprisings, demonstrates the persistence of this mechanism as a political solution in times of crisis. This paper examines the evolution of caretaker governments in Bangladesh, compares the 2024 case with earlier iterations—particularly the 2006–2008 technocratic-military model—and situates it within global experiences of interim governments in Pakistan, Nepal, and Greece. Drawing on constitutional and judicial documents, secondary scholarship, and ten key informant interviews (KIIs) with political analysts, editors, academics, veteran politicians, and youth activists, the study finds that the 2024 CTG represents a qualitatively distinct “reformist-populist” variant of interim governance. Unlike its predecessors, which were narrowly custodial, the Yunus-led caretaker combines electoral supervision with institutional reforms, civil society inclusion, and populist legitimacy rooted in mass mobilization. While this hybrid form addresses longstanding demands for neutrality and reform, it also raises concerns about overreach, civic restrictions, and the erosion of representative politics. The paper concludes that the 2024 CTG marks both continuity and rupture in Bangladesh’s political trajectory, offering comparative lessons on the promise and perils of caretaker and interim governments globally.
Syed Mohsin (Wed,) studied this question.
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