The article examines the implementation of economic mechanisms in state regulation of family relations against the backdrop of demographic crisis in modern Russia. Using the methodology of institutional economics and transaction cost theory, the consequences of an eightfold increase in state divorce fees are analyzed. The findings reveal that fiscal barriers have asymmetric effects across different social groups: creating significant obstacles for low-income populations while minimally affecting the behavior of high-income groups. A model for evaluating the price elasticity of demand for divorce procedures has been developed, demonstrating the low long-term effectiveness of fiscal restrictions. The study substantiates the feasibility of implementing differentiated economic instruments (progressive fee rates, family tax preferences, incentives for prenuptial agreements) that account for income levels and social status of families. A comprehensive set of measures is proposed to enhance the institutional attractiveness of marriage through state funding of family mediation services and expansion of housing programs for young families.
Brezgunova et al. (Mon,) studied this question.