Key points are not available for this paper at this time.
We examine how ownership and governance structures shape incentives, power relations, and strategic interaction in gig economy platforms. Using an institutional game-theoretic framework, we employ stylised games as a comparative heuristic to show how alternative governance arrangements stabilise different classes of outcomes, rather than serving as predictions under universal rationality assumptions. Investor-owned platforms tend to stabilise power-skewed, low-compensation outcomes that are individually rational given unilateral rule-setting authority, yet collectively inferior in terms of effort, service quality, and worker well-being. Repeated interaction can sustain conditional cooperation, but such outcomes remain institutionally fragile in fragmented, algorithmically managed labour markets. By contrast, cooperative and participatory platforms reshape the strategic environment by endogenising rule-setting, surplus allocation, and monitoring, while more democratically oriented investor-owned firms may provide a lower-risk avenue for gig workers for participation and equitable outcomes. The analysis contributes to debates on platform governance, economic democracy, and digital labour.
Altman et al. (Wed,) studied this question.