Contemporary interdependence and the governance gap: the obsolescence of UNCLOS in submarine cable security

Introduction Although almost entirely privately owned, submarine fiber-optic cables form the critical infrastructure of the global digital economy. This background of private ownership now intersects with the contemporary reality of geopolitical competition, where infrastructure is increasingly targeted through hybrid warfare and ‘grey-zone’ operations with diverse asymmetrical actors involved. Methods By utilizing a qualitative methodology that combines doctrinal legal analysis with case studies of recent infrastructural disruption, the research identify that the existing problem is that the primary international legal framework, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as a state-centric regime is fundamentally unfitted to address these modern threats based on the contemporary intertwined interdependence between the state and non-state actors on the submarine cable, thus creating a critical governance gap. Results Drawing on International Relations concepts of regime theory and the securitization of infrastructure, this paper argues that the reliance of UNCLOS on flag state jurisdiction is obsolete when states themselves are involved, geopolitical tension in the background, as well as the private sectors interests including owners, operators, and industry bodies, such as the ICPC are left unaccommodated while they are the operators as well as main shareholders on this aspect. Discussion The article concludes that mitigating these security deficits requires moving beyond traditional state-centric treaties, pointing toward the necessity of exploring multi-stakeholder, hybrid governance models in future research.