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The People’s Republic of China has recently announced several global governance initiatives, with the Global Development Initiative (GDI) at the forefront. Launched in 2021, the GDI is simultaneously embedded within United Nations (UN) frameworks surrounding the Sustainable Development Goals and supposed to advance ‘true multilateralism’ aligned with China’s broader vision for world order. In doing so, the GDI complicates both ‘status quo’ and ‘revisionist’ interpretations of China’s engagement with global governance, alongside efforts to refine this binary. Bridging historical institutionalism and Neo-Gramscian political economy, we argue that the GDI constitutes a form of ‘institutional layering’ that serves as a component of a broader counter-hegemonic strategy: Rather than displacing existing frameworks, China seeks to embed new practices, principles, and alliances within them to advance its material, ideational, and organizational interests. We demonstrate how the GDI functions as a low-cost, low-risk component of a ‘war of position’ that leverages UN legitimacy while incrementally contesting liberal norms and assess its transformative potential for altering the nature of global (development) governance.
Taggart et al. (Thu,) studied this question.