Chinese Capitalism in the OECD Mirror

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes Suzanne Berger Geoffrey Garrett, Partisan Politics in the Global Economy (Cambridge University Press, 1998); Torben Iversen, Jonas Pontusson Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary Marks Wolfgang Streeck Robert Boyer and Michel Albert, Capitalism versus Capitalism (Four Walls Eight Windows, 1993). Bernhard Ebbinghaus Margarita Estevez-Abe, Torben Iversen W. Arthur Lewis, The Principles of Economic Planning (G. Allen Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama (Pantheon, 1968); George Garvy, Money, Financial Flows, and Credit in the Soviet Union (Harvard University Press, 1977); Janos Kornai, ‘Resource-Constrained vs. Demand-Constrained Systems’, Econometrica, Vol. 47, No. 4 (1979), pp. 801–19; Andrei Shleifer Andrei Shleifer, ‘State vs. Private Ownership’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1998), pp. 133–50; and Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes Daniel Verdier, Moving Money (Cambridge University Press, 2002); Mark J. Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance (Oxford University Press, 2002); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Raghuram Rajan Lewis, The Principles of Economic Planning; Myrdal, Asian Drama; Garvy, Money, Financial Flows; Kornai, ‘Resource-Constrained vs. Demand-Constrained systems’; Shleifer Shleifer, ‘State vs. Private Ownership’; and La Porta et al., ‘Government Ownership of Banks’. Michael J. Hiscox, ‘Class Versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade’, International Organization. Vol. 55, No. 1 (2001), pp. 1–46. Masahiko Aoki, The Japanese Main Bank System: An Introductory Overview (World Bank, 1994). Stewart C. Myers, ‘Capital Structure Puzzle’, Journal of Finance, Vol. 39, No. 3 (1984), pp. 575–92; Stewart C. Myers Douglas Diamond, ‘Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 99, No. 4 (1991), pp. 689–721. Mary A. O'Sullivan, The Political Economy of Corporate Governance in Germany, Jerome Levy Institute Working Paper No. 226, 1998, p. 7. As a result of the Works Constitution Act of 1952, enterprises with more than 500 employees were obligated to reserve only one-third of the supervisory board seats for employee representatives and not until the codetermination Act of 1976 was employee representation on supervisory boards extended to all companies with more than 2000 employees (O'Sullivan, The Political Economy of Corporate Governance in Germany, p. 7). Wolfgang Streeck, ‘Successful Adjustment to Turbulent Markets: The Automobile Industry’, in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), Industry and Politics in West Germany: Toward the Third Republic (Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 113–156. Ibid., p. 123. Richard Deeg, Finance Capitalism Unveiled: Banks and the German Political Economy (University of Michigan Press, 1999), p. 126. Charles Calomiris, U.S. Bank Deregulation in Historical Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2000). John R. Freeman, Democracy and Markets: The Politics of Mixed Economies (Cornell University Press, 1989). On this see Irene Dyk, ‘The Austrian People's Party’, in Jim Sweeney Franz Traxler, ‘Austria: Still the Country of Corporatism’, in Anthony Ferner Peter Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 38; and Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets, p. 27. Mark Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners (Princeton University Press, 1994). Naomi Lamoreaux, ‘Bank Mergers in Late Nineteenth-Century New England: The Contingent Nature of Structural Change’, Journal of Economic History, Vol. 51, No. 3 (1991), pp. 537–57; Calomiris, U.S. Bank Deregulation. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners. Marco Becht Hoshi John Wilson, French Banking Structure and Credit Policy (Harvard University Press, 1957); Henry Germain-Martin, ‘France’, in Beckhart (ed.), Banking Systems (Columbia University Press, 1954); and P. C. Dupont, Le Contrôle des Banques et la Direction du Crédit en France (Dunod, 1952). 461 out of 494 representatives from mainland France voted for the law; 442 from the left and centre, and 19 from the right; 33 on the right voted against. Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques, Paris, 1986. Jean-Jacques Carré, Paul Dubois Corruption and Cronyism often Thwart Efforts to Eradicate Bad Debts’, Washington Post, 6 June 2005, Section A01. The 25 per cent cap was increased from the 15 per cent limit that was set in 2003. China's scores on the World Bank's ‘Rule of Law’ index slid from –0.22 in 1998 to –0.47 in 2004. Scores for the World Bank's ‘Governance Indicators’ range from –2.5 to +2.5 with a mean of zero. Higher negative scores correspond to poorer governance. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower. Ekkehard Ernst, ‘Financial Systems, Industrial Relations, and Industry Specialization: An Econometric Analysis of Institutional Complementarities’, in Helene Schubert (ed.), The Transformation of the European Financial System: Where do we go? Proceedings of the 1st OeNB Workshop, Vienna, 2004, pp. 60–95.