Pro-Islamic Public Education in Turkey: The Imam-Hatıp Schools

Abstract The article focuses on the imam-hatip (prayer leader/preacher) schools, explaining Kemalist education reforms, documenting when, why and how the imam-hatip schools were established, measuring the changing popularity of these schools and evaluating whether the schools constitute a threat to the principle of secularism. Graduates of the imam-hatip schools have formed new generations of Islamists demanding the Islamization of the state, not recognizing the secularist regime and supporting Islamist FMEparties. This article illustrates the relationship between Kemalism and pro-Islamic public education. Notes 1. The Diyanet as a public institution has a particular role in the production and transmission of Muslim religious knowledge. It has responsibility for organizing and providing religious services to Muslims in Turkey. 2. In fact, since the proclamation of the republic, the dispute between Kemalism and Islamism rooted in the definition of the identity of Turkish citizens, accompanying the support of the majority of citizens for Islamist parties at an increasing rate, has always been the main determinant of the path of Turkish political life. 3. Furthermore, it can be observed that the influence of religion appears to be on the rise throughout the world. 4. The view based on Turkey's future as part of Europe should not be reduced to membership of the European Union. It is assumed that 'being European' transcends 'being a member of the EU'. 5. S. Mardin, 'Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey', in J.P. Piscatori (ed.), Islam in the Political Process (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp.142, 138–59. 6. N. Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGillUniversity Pres, 1964), p.246. 7. See the very informative work of F. Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (London: Routledge, 1993). 8. With this law, 'Medresetü-l Eimmeti vel Hutaba' was abolished. Medresetü-l Eimmeti vel Hutaba had been founded in 1913 unifying 'Medresetü-l Vaazin' and 'Medresetü-l İrşad' under the reformation process forced through by Unionists (İttihat- erakki) in the last years of the Ottoman State. 9. Even more radical breaks with the traditional image of women were symbolized by drastic actions such as the organization of the first Miss Turkey contest in 1929 and the opening of public beaches for women in the early 1930s. 10. See A. Mango, Ataturk (Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press, 2000). 11. See M.K. Atatürk, A Speech Delivered by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 1927 (Nutuk) (İstanbul: Ministry of Education Printing Plant, 1963). 12. S. Duguid, 'The Politics of Unity:Hamidean Policy in Eastern Anatolia', Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.9, No.2 (1973), pp.139–55. 13. However, this duty was fulfilled by the Turkish Armed Forces in the name of Turkish citizens in the 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997 military interventions by smoothing government operations incompatible with the founding philosophy of the Turkish nation-state. 14. These schools had only junior divisions (three years) and did not have senior divisions (a four year lycée programme). The schools were open to elementary school graduates. Having completed the imam-hatip school, students were to go to secular public high schools to be nominated as a prayer leader or preacher. In the 1924–25 academic year Edirne, Ödemiş, Hopa, Şavşat, Niğde imam-hatip schools were closed, two new imam-hatip schools were opened in Artvin and İzmir and the number of imam-hatip schools decreased from 29 to 26 in 1925. In the 1925–26 academic year Erzurum, Eskişehir, Şanlıurfa, Amasya, Gaziantep, Kahramanmaraş, Artvin, İzmir imam-hatip schools were closed, two new imam-hatip schools were opened in Of and Akşehir and the number of imam-hatip years decreased from 26 to 20 in 1926. In the 1926–27 academic year all the imam-hatip schools except Kütahya and İstanbul imam-hatip schools were closed. These two imam-hatip schools stayed open until the 1929–30 academic year. They were closed in 1930. 15. H. Hayıt, 'İmam-Hatip Liselerinin Dünü ve Bugünü', Din Öğretimi Dergisi, Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, Kasım-Aralık (1991), p. 8. 16. R. Buyrukçu, Din Görevlisinin Mesleğini Temsil Gücü (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1995), p.79. 17. A. Gül, Cumhuriyet Dönemi (1923–1997) Orta Öğretimde Din Eğitimi (Ankara: Türkiye Din Eğitimi Vakfı Yayınları, 1998), p.118. 18. On 15 January 1949, four imam-hatip courses opened in Ankara and İstanbul. The courses in Ankara were coordinated by Yusuf Ziya Yörükan and Hasan Hüsnü Erdem, and those in İstanbul were coordinated by Celal Hoca and Kilisli Rifat Bilge. In the following months, eight courses were opened in other provinces of the country. Before the general election held in May 1950, all over the country, 50 people had got certificate from these courses. 19. C. Baltacı, Türkiye'de Din Eğitimi ve Öğretimi (İstanbul: İslam Medeniyeti Vakfı Yayınları, 1993), p.16. 20. Seven imam-hatip schools were openned in 1951. These were in Adana, Ankara, Isparta, İstanbul, Kayseri, Konya, Kahramanmaraş. The schools had only junior divisions. However in 1955 the classes in these schools were increased, imam-hatip schools had both junior and senior divisions corresponding to the secondary level of education for the first time in the academic year 1955–56. As is the case in secondary schools (three years of middle school plus three years of high school), the junior division of imam-hatip schools was open to elementary school graduates. Having completed the junior level, the students advanced to the senior division. An extra year beyond the regular high school was added in order to allow for time spent on vocational training and the slightly reduced academic workload. In 1958, in the whole country there were 18 imam-hatip schools, two of them having no senior division. For details see N. Dinçer, 1913'ten Bugüne İmam-Hatip Okulları Meselesi (İstanbul: Yağmur Yayınevi, 1974), p.65. 21. The New Turkey Party and the Justice Party were the two parties placed in the centre-right of the Turkish political spectrum; they were advocates of DP heritage and fought each other for DP votes. 22. The record for founding the imam-hatip schools belongs to the prime minister Süleyman Demirel, who was the leader of the JP. Demirel was president in 1993–2000, after Turgut Özal died in 1993. 23. M.Ş. Aydın, Cumhuriyet Döneminde Din Eğitimi Öğretmeni Yetiştirme ve İstihdamı 1923–1938 (Kayseri: İlahiyat Bilimleri Araştırma Vakfı, 2000), p.64. 24. There were nearly 800 female students in both the junior and senior sections of the imam-hatip schools in the late 1960s. 25. S. Cebeci, 'İmam-Hatip Liselerinden Mezun Olanların Yönelişleri ve Sebepleri', Din Öğretimi Dergisi, Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, Ocak-Şubat (1992), p.110. 26. The centre-right parties and the Islamist party argued that the governing statute (that in order to attend the imam-hatip schools one must be a male) issued by the Ministry of Education during the second Erim cabinet (a military-backed reform government) contradicted the Fundamentals of National Education Law affirming equality of opportunity: 'All citizens, male and female are assured equal opportunity" and 'Educational institutions are open to every individual, regardless of language, race, sex and religion. No individual, family, group or class will be accorded any privilege in the educational system'. This issue was taken to the Council of State by the centre-right parties and the Islamist Party and the Council of State decided that the governing statute had violated equality of education and ruled that female students were eligible to attend the imam-hatip schools. 27. In 1956, under the rule of the DP, voluntary religious education began in elementary schools. In 1966, under the rule of the JP, voluntary religious education began in the high schools. 28. Graduates of the imam-hatip schools formed the Islamist elite, pursuing professions in economic, social and political life in the 1980s, and supported the WF. 29. Turgut Özal said that he was proud of being a member of Nakşibendi tarikat during his presidency. 30. These graduates were not only males. In the early 1990s the number of female graduates of imam-hatip schools was over 70,000 (nearly 50,000 from the junior division and 20,000 from the senior division). 31. The party was supported by some liberal democrats, liberal socialists, ex-Marxists, ex-social democrats, Turk-Islam synthesizers, Kurdish separationists. In other words, the party formed a heterogeneous coalition of different ideologies whose common point has been enmity to Kemalism and the TAF. It should be underlined that although the party aims to give a portrait of heterogeneity, all the definitive decisions are taken by the Islamists in the party. Within the party organization, when the interests of the Islamists contradict the interests of other groups, the Islamists win because they are seen as the real owners of the party. 32. It should be underlined that excluding worship times wearing headscarves (for female Muslims) is not a condition of being Muslim in the Koran. 33. The process of complete-counter-revolution began in November 2002 when the JDP won power and the process went forward when an Islamist president was elected in August 2007. 34. The lawsuit of dissolution of this party for violating the unity of the state has continued under the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. 35. It was estimated that an Islamist president would appoint Islamists to the vacant posts of public institutions, judiciary and universities. This has been realized. 36. The future of the imam-hatip schools seems strictly connected to the future of the governing party. As is known, the lawsuit of the dissolution of the JDP for violating the principle of laicism has continued under the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court and the decision of the Court is awaited. 37. The buildings of the existing imam-hatip schools were constructed through various means. Almost 66% of these schools were constructed by so-called private social associations (tarikats), 19.35% of them were built through cooperative efforts between centre-right and/or Islamist party governments and religious sects. For details see İmam Hatip Liseleri Kırk Yaşında, Din Öğretimi Dergisi (special edition) (Sept.–Oct. 1991), p.25. 38. Besides constructing buildings for the imam-hatip schools, the tarikats have provided most of the educational equipment and scholarships for needy students, built dormitories, operated housing for students (these are commonly called 'tarikat houses' and are spmetimes called by the names of tarikats such as Nakşi house, Süleymanci house, Nurcu house, Gülen house, Işık house). It should be emphasized that the budget allocated to the General Directorate of Religious Education (a unit under the Ministry of Education) has been approximately 3% of the total budget for national education since the establishment of the imam-hatip schools. 39. Students from metropolitan areas have attended an imam-hatip school far from home in order to find acommodation there, rather than attending an imam-hatip school close to home. Poverty and inadequate transportation have been the main factors in this choice. 40. Study of the knowledge of God and God's attributes. 41. Interpretation of Koran based on its translation. 42. Modelling ethical codes based on stress on the spiritual importance of the life of the prophet Muhammed. 43. Study of the doctrines of Islam. 44. Study of Islamic law following the teachings of the Hanafi School of Islam. 45. Focusing on the science of grammar and syntax, students are prepared to speak Arabic. 46. In the Anatolian imam-hatip schools, the cultural academic courses are taught in English. 47. The Ministry of Education has pretended not to see these defects for years, however these defects have been published in secular newspapers (such as Cumhuriyet Gazetesi) and occasionally broadcast by secular television channels (such as Başkent Tv) under the title of 'scandal'. 48. Students who aim to have education in faculties other than theology, such as law or medicine, should be directed towards secular high schools and equality of opportunity should be offered to all students all over the country so that those from the poor families have a chance to climb to a higher status in society according to their qualifications. 49. The perception of a social state and widespread combat of poverty at both national and regional level (shunning ideological bias) should accompany this policy. 50. Female graduates are only employed as teachers of the Koran under the Directorate of Religious Affairs. However they should also be employed as prayer leaders or preachers. Otherwise, Muslim women wait for men to solve problems such as wearing headscarves in public or those (especially related to women's rights) emerging from the dichotomy between Islamic law and secular law. 51. Although theology faculties have been founded as secular units of the universities just as faculties such as law, medicine; theology faculties have been invaded by tarikats and today most of the academicians in these faculties are members of several tarikats. Very few graduates of these faculties are loyal to Kemalism. 52. According to the Kemalist elite, the capitalization process by means of state intervention was more humane. 53. The Kemalist elite wondered whether Turkish citizens would be aware of the dichotomy between reason and belief. 54. According to the Kemalist elite, the correct way to have a liberal democratic regime could not be achieved by liberal democracy, the democratization process by republican democracy was preferable. 55. It should be underlined that the term 'Islamic democracy' advocated by moderate Islamists implies a paradox. Because the unification of the sovereignty of God (Islamic government) and the sovereignty of the people (democratic government) under a term seems irrational. Furthermore, the term Islamic democracy is incompatible with Kemalism. 56. According to them, Kemalism has been the ideology of the RPP. In other words, they have reduced the founding philosophy of the state to an ideology of a party. 57. The claim that the military's autonomy should be restricted to matters of external threat seems unrealistic, because in today's globalized world it is hard to distinguish between external and internal threats. In this regard, it should be remembered that in Turkey there have been several politicians, columnists, journalists, opinion leaders and academicians who have been funded by interest groups all over the world in return for pursuing the interests of these groups. The Leadership Programme of the Secretary of State in the USA is one striking example. So it is not easy to determine whether an idea is the product of the internal system or not. Thus it is reasonable to say that the Turkish political system requires a non-party arbitrator to protect the founding philosophy until the majority of Turkish citizens gains consciousness to protect it and see that the reason for their existence is based on the survival of the founding philosophy. However the idea of seeing the army's political autonomy as legitimate in Turkey may seem strange (even paradoxical) to intellectuals of the developed countries. But it should be underlined that enlightened, patriotic and democratic Turkish people, aware of living in a country in a region where disputes are based on ethnic-religious wars, have never faced trustworthy politicians (most of whom have abused the ethnic-religious identities) in many respects, and have conceived the TAF (tracing a direct line from Atatürk) as the ultimate guardian and trustee of the democratic Turkish nation-state. 58. As a result of a developed economy, citizens will behave freely. For instance they will not vote for a party in return for aid from tarikats as experienced in the 2002 and 2007 general elections. Getting a vote in return for financial and food aid has been the best known strategy of all the Islamist parties in Turkey. The JDP owed its success to this strategy in the last two general and local elections. 59. B. Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), p.406. 60. The centre-left party (RPP) has never been the only governing party except for 1923–50. However, since 1950, from time to time, the RPP became a government partner (either being senior/led the government or junior partner) in past coalition governments. 61. The Islamist movement in the Middle East has shifted from seeking Islamization from above (as in the Islamist Revolution in Iran) towards Islamization from below through meeting needs at the grassroots.