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This article provides the first empirical test of the idea that discrepancy is not needed in order to arouse cognitive dissonance.Dissonance was aroused when Ss felt responsible for some aversive consequence, regardless of whether their behavior was consistent (writing a proattitudinal essay) or inconsistent (a counterattitudinal essay) with beliefs.The data demonstrate that in both situations, dissonance is aroused.This result, based on the dissonance motivation model of Cooper and Fazio (1984), strongly suggests that the motivational basis for dissonance is the felt responsibility for aversive consequences.The theoretical implications of this outlook are explored, including a discussion of the many ways that it expands the applicability of dissonance theory.One of the most frequently demonstrated phenomena in social psychology is that people who act in a way that is inconsistent with their attitudes experience a motivational state that causes them to alter those attitudes.The primary theoretical explanation for this motivation has been Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance.This theory is based on a principle of cognitive consistency and assumes that an aversive, drivelike state is aroused when cognitive inconsistency is perceived.Attitude change follows, then, as a means of restoring consistency and reducing the aversive state.Dissonance theory has been able to account for a host of phenomena, ranging from the proselytizing behavior of religious cultists (Festinger, Riecken, Linder, Cooper, Sherman, 1970b), there must be some commitment to
Scher et al. (Sun,) studied this question.