Neutrality and War in Italian policy 1939-40

In the summer of 1939 the Fascist government of Italy was not prepared for nor did it wish to go to war. Neither did it wish to break its ideological solidarity with Nazi Germany. Therefore, Italian diplomacy during the period between September 1939 and October 1940 had as its major objective the achievement of a negotiated peace in which a balance of power between the ideological camps of fascism and democracy would be ensured. What follows is a description of the pressures and the processes of thought and action which, paradoxically, led Mussolini to declare war against France and England and, finally, to invade Greece. Italy did not realize that war was truly imminent until the Salzburg Conference. Ciano told Hitler of 'Italy's great surprise at the entirely unexpected gravity of the situation', and he pointed out that no previous indication 'had been given by Germany.. that the situation in respect of Poland was so grave'.1 Hitler depreciated the gravity of the situation by describing the forthcoming German-Polish war as another adjustment in the area of international diplomacy similar in nature to Munich and to Italy's seizure of Albania. He refused to consider it as an event that would precipitate a general war with the democracies. Ciano said that Mussolini believed the Danzig crisis could be solved by an international conference which the Italians would be happy to propose.