A ‘Risky Westward Turn’? Putin's 9–11 Script and Ordinary Russians

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes This research is supported by a grant, number 0203087, from the US National Science Foundation, Geography and Regional Science Programme. The authors thank Dr. Elena Petrenko of the Foundation of Public Opinion in Moscow who worked closely in developing the questionnaire for the national survey and who supervised its successful and timely completion. Dr. Nadezhda Borodulina of the Institute of Geography of the Russian Academy of Sciences was responsible for the identification and collection of the textual material analysed in this article. Bush later noted his appreciation of this gesture and of Putin's decision to ‘stand down’ Russian forces after America's forces had been placed on high alert: ‘It was a moment when it clearly said to me that he understands the Cold War is over’. (Bush quoted in Sipress, 2001, p. A1 and President Bush's remarks at a joint appearance with President Putin at a Crawford, TX school, 15 November 2001). For an American account of the Russian role see Woodward (2002). ‘On Russian President Vladimir Putin’s Telegram of Condolence to US President George Bush, 11 September 2001', Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, www.ln.mid.ru (look under ‘Documents and Materials’ link for speeches). ‘Statement by President Putin of Russia on the Terrorist Acts in the US, Moscow, 11 September 2001’, available from Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, www.ln.mid.ru. See, for example, the arguments of Goldgeier and Trenin (2002). See Clover (1999) for a review of the Russian tradition of claiming Central Asia as part of the Russian strategic space. According to Russian journalists, Putin's team of advisers included Sergei Ivanov, Minister of Defence, Igor Ivanov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aleksandr Voloshin, Head of the Presidential Administration, Anatolii Kvashnin, Chief of the General Staff, and Vladimir Rushailo; see Volkova (2001). Critical geopolitics is a post-structuralist school of thought in contemporary political geography; see O´ Tuathail (1996, 1999). For a study of popular geopolitics that addresses the image of Russia in American geopolitical culture see Sharp (2000). Kuchins (2002b, p. 13) stated that ‘As a consequence of the policies of Gorbachev and his successors in the Kremlin, Russian power and influence in world affairs dropped more precipitously and rapidly than that of any major power in peacetime in modern world history. The most fundamental challenge for Russians in the last decade has been to fashion a foreign and security policy that matches the country’s limited means'. The recognition of the country's limited means is growing. A VTsIOM (All-Russian Centre for Research on Public Opinion) survey of November 2001 showed that Russian society was split into ‘optimists’ and ‘pessimists’. ‘Extreme optimists’ (10% of respondents) believed that if Russia followed the way of Western countries, she would need only a few years to reach their level. ‘Moderate optimists’ (35%) were convinced that Russia would need dozens of years and ‘moderate pessimists’ (13%) even 100 years. Finally, for the relatively numerous ‘extreme pessimists’ (24% in total), the Western model was not useful, because they were either persuaded that by using it Russia could reach the present Western level only after 200 years and more (14% of respondents), or thought that Russia would never be able to catch up the West (10% of respondents). See Chapter 3 in Smith (1999). Also see G.A. Zyuganov, Za gorizontom (Moscow, 1995); G.A. Zyuganov, Kontseptsiya natsional'noi bezopasnosti RF v 1996–2000 (Moscow, 1995); G.A. Zyuganov, Rossiya i sovremennyi mir (Moscow, 1995); G. Zyuganov, Geografiya pobedy: Osnovy rossiiskoi geopolitiki (Moscow, 1997); S. Baburin, Rossiiskii put': stanovlenie rossiiskoi geopolitiki nakanune XXI veka (Moscow, 1995); A. Mitrofanov, Shagi novoi geopolitiki (Moscow, 1997). See Kolossov (2001, 2002b). ‘Neo-Eurasianists’ believe that Russia is neither an Asian nor a European country but has a unique Eurasian identity. ‘Expansionists’ want to extend Russian power to all parts of the Eurasian landmass (Kolossov and Turousky, 2001). See O´ Tuathail (2002). For the sake of simplicity, we are not investigating the other key concept in the study of practical geopolitical reasoning, storylines. Unlike scripts, storylines are discursively consolidated foreign policy arguments about particular events, challenges and situations. Scripts are public performances that are often incoherent and vague because they reference multiple storylines that are mutually exclusive. Storylines are relatively coherent sets of arguments with clear policy choices associated with them. To consider fully Putin's interpretation of 9–11 as a storyline, we need to investigate the alternative storylines offered in Communist-backed newspapers like Sovetskaya Rossiya (formally, it is independent; circulation about 300,000 copies) and the national-patriotic paper, Zavtra. ‘On Russian President Vladimir Putin’s Telegram of Condolence to US President George Bush', Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, www.In.mid.ru. Joint Russia–NATO statement, 13 September 2001; transcript of Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov's Speech at the Nixon Centre, Washington, 19 September 2001, available from Lexis-Nexis. In his interview with the American press, 10 November 2001, Putin spoke about showing Bush intelligence from Chechnya that revealed Islamic rebels plotting to kill Americans when they met at the APEC summit in Shanghai. Statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor Ivanov in the Course of the General Political Debate at the 56th Session of the UN General Assembly, 16 November 2001. ‘Russian politicians began to use a tougher language. The recently appointed Prime Minister was the first to legitimate this new language by publicly announcing that we would “bury them in their own crap”. It was after saying this that Putin’s ratings in the polls began to rise astronomically; finally there was a “tough guy” at the wheel' (Kovalev, 2000, p. 4). After 9–11 Putin could use such language on the international stage without problems. For example, Putin compared international terrorists to bacteria ‘which adapt to the organism bearing it’ in an exchange with reporters after meeting Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt; see Drozdiak Putin, interview with German media, 24 September 2001. Statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor Ivanov in the Course of the General Political Debate at the 56th Session of the UN General Assembly, 16 November 2001. Statement by Igor Ivanov Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation at the Meeting of the UN Security Council on Counter-Terrorism, 14 November 2001. National Public Radio interview and listener call-in with Russian President Vladimir Putin, New York, 15 November 2002. Speech by President Vladimir Putin at a Meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 28 September 2001. President Putin's statement at a meeting of the Russian Federation government, 9 October 2001. Speech by Russian President Vladimir Putin at a meeting with participants of the 24th Conference of European Ministers of Justice, Moscow, 4 October 2001; National Public Radio interview and listener call-in with Russian President Vladimir Putin, New York, 15 November 2002. Meeting of Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin with Chief Correspondents of the Moscow Bureaus of leading US Mass Media at the Kremlin, 10 November 2001. The fact that the majority of the 9–11 terrorists came from Saudi Arabia, and that the infamous ‘Arab terrorist’ Khattab in Chechnya also came from there were sources of strain in US–Saudi relations. Russian officials, more than the United States, were strident in their criticism of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan as breeding grounds of terrorism. Marginalised in all this talk was the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, which Hosni Mubarak of Egypt pointed out was a ‘breeding ground’ for a new generation of terrorism threatening world security; see Erlanger (2001). Statement by Aleksandr Yaevenko, the official spokesman of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Regarding the note of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Georgian side over the threat of international terrorism’. For an exception see the statement by Igor Ivanov at the Meeting of the UN Security Council on Counter-Terrorism. Though Wahhabism refers to a particular version of Islam that is found predominantly in the Arabian peninsula, the term is used widely in Russia to signify any sort of Islamic fundamentalism. President Putin's Address to the Bundestag, 25 September 2001. Speech by President Vladimir Putin at the meeting of the CIS Heads of Government Council in Moscow, 28 September 2001. See Putin's Bundestag speech, his address at the meeting of the CIS Heads of Government Council in Moscow, 28 September 2001, and speech at the Russian Embassy in Washington DC, 13 November 2001. Sergei Yastrzhembsky, quoted in LaFraniere (2001), p. A17. Meeting of Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin with Chief Correspondents of the Moscow Bureaus of Leading US Mass Media at the Kremlin, 10 November 2001. See Lieven (2002) for a balanced account. He quotes one source as claiming Bin Laden sent 400 men to Chechnya. Motivations exist on both sides to exaggerate the significance of radical Islam. In an 8 November 2001 videotaped message, Bin Laden denounces Putin by name as well as the Russian war in Chechnya. These storylines continued to be influential; see Politkovskaya (2001a, 2001b). George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, Washington DC, 20 September 2001. Putin's representation of the causes of the Chechen conflict requires more detailed examination than can be provided here. Suffice it to say that it involves an acknowledgement, on one hand, that the problems of Chechnya involve more than international terrorism and external interference yet, soon after, reiterates the theme of international terrorism. For example, in his interview with American reporters on 10 November 2001, he said: ‘We are waging a land operation against international terrorism in the territory of the North Caucasus. The problem of Chechnya is much more complex than simply a problem of international terrorism. But it is a fact that international terrorism is present there’. These words are repeated in many sources including the Financial Times; Asia–Africa Intelligence Wire; Aris (2001); Ferreira-Marques (2001). Quoted in Glasser (2001b). President Putin was no doubt pleased when, during an interview with National Public Radio in the United States, he heard one listener declare that ‘it seems like Russia has gone through pretty much what we are going through now with Chechnya with the terrorists’ and ask what advice he could give the United States about handling terrorism; see National Public Radio interview and listener call-in with Russian President Vladimir Putin, New York, 15 November 2002. President Putin's address to the Bundestag, 24 September 2001. Putin, in fact, in his Bundestag address offered an updated Russian version of Sir Halford Mackinder's old fear of a German-heartland alliance, noting that ‘Europe will consolidate its reputation as a powerful and truly independent centre of world politics, firmly and for the long term, if it can join its own capabilities with Russia’s possibilities—with the human, territorial and natural resources, and the economic, cultural and defence potential of Russia'. For Mackinder's biography and geopolitical models see Parker (1982). Quoted in Glasser (2001a); see also M. Khodarenok, ‘Na vtoroi “afgan” net sil’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 2 November 2002, p. 2; (http://ng.ru/politics/2001–11–02/1 afgan.html). I. Korotchenko, ‘Armeiskoe dvoevlastie’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 6 March 2002, http://www.ng.ru/politics/2002–03–06/2 army.html. An article by Igor Bunin, general director of the Centre for Political Technologies, ‘Two oppositions to Putin’, www.Politkom.ru, 13 November 2001, examined the leftist and ‘El’tsin family' oppositions to Putin's policies. He concludes that Putin has been able to unite ‘strong state’ ideals with liberal values and that any opposition remains fractured along ideological lines and interest priorities. The article is also available as FBIS (Foreign Broadcasting Information Service) report CEP 2001111300025. Meeting of RF President Vladimir Putin with Chief Correspondents of the Moscow Bureaus of Leading US Mass Media at the Kremlin, 10 November 2001. President Bush and President Putin's joint press conference, 13 November 2001. Speech by President Putin to the Baker Institute, Rice University, Houston, Texas, 14 November 2001. He reiterated these themes in an interview with the Financial Times, 13 December 2001, and complained that ‘Cold War era’ politics and prejudice were blocking Russia's opening of negotiations with the World Trade Organisation. President Bush and President Putin's joint press conference, 13 November 2001. All figures from the Pew Global Attitudes Project; see the tables in http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=165. Russians rank 7th in the samples who dislike US music, films and TV, behind Bolivia, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Egypt, Jordan and Pakistan. But on another measure the US ranks high in Russian eyes: among respondents to a survey of Russians by FOM reported in Kolossov (2002b), 29% mentioned the American general contribution to world culture, moral and spiritual norms, laws protecting democracy and human rights as ‘civilisational’ criteria. The USA, Germany and France were at the top of the list of ‘civilised countries’, with respectively 33%, 22% and 20% of the ‘votes’ (26% refused to answer or could not give an example of a ‘civilised country’). See the tables in A. Petrova, ‘Dearest enemy’, 17 May 2002, http://english.fom.ru/reports/frames/eof021html. Michael McFaul remarks on this trend in his comments transcribed in the Report of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ‘Is the US–Russia Partnership Working?’, 10 October 2002, http://www.ceip.org/files/events/2002–10–10-us-russia-tscript.asp. We use the term ‘significantly’ in this section in the statistical sense—that is, the mean replies are statistically different at the 5% level of confidence. If the mean percentage difference between two sub-samples is less than 3.5% (the margin of error in the survey), we do not consider the difference to be significant. Pew Global Attitudes Project, 3 December 2002; see http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=165. See Høiris Wright, Goldenberg and Karny (2000). The polls are summarised and reviewed in O'Loughlin data from Pew Global Attitudes survey, http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportID=165. For instance, answering the open-ended question of a FOM monitor survey on 3–4 August 2002, ‘Please, in your opinion, list the main problems faced by contemporary Russia’, 28% of respondents named the low level of economic development (economic crisis and unemployment), 26% the low level and quality of life (poverty, high prices, low salaries, inaccessible education and health care etc), 19% the lack of an efficient system of state management (weakness of power, inadequate legislation, corruption and concentration of power in the hands of tycoons, the absence of national idea and ideals, the situation in the army), 15% criminality and drugs, 5% the moral crisis and 5% the war in Chechnya and ethnic conflicts (20% could not answer). There was thus not a single respondent who worried about the international situation of the country, international terrorism etc; see http://www.fom.ru/. When asked during our survey ‘What are the most pressing issues in Russia today?’, 62% gave ‘internal problems’ as the answer and another 26% answered ‘internal as well as external’. Only a tiny minority (8%) thought that foreign problems were most pressing. Though Putin has stressed that Russia does not require any compensation for her decision to support the anti-terrorist coalition, the political opposition and many in the media accused the US of not reciprocating, even drawing up a list of Russian steps toward closer cooperation. Russian complaints against the US included the US decision to leave the 1972 Anti-Missile Defence Treaty, the refusal to help Russia to restructure her debts, as was done in the case of Poland and Pakistan, the continuation of the Jackson–Vanik trade amendment, a decision to stock nuclear warheads instead of destroying them, the tightening of US visa rules, the establishment of drastic quotas for imports of steel from Russia, a new wave of criticism of human rights violations in Chechnya and the state of civil freedoms in Russia, the active promotion of Baltic republics' membership of NATO and the refusal to support the position of Paris and Berlin, who proposed to limit the new wave of enlargement to Central European countries, and official American declarations about the intention to keep new American bases in former Soviet Central Asia for a long time under the pretext of the need to support ‘democratic reforms’, i.e. to exchange loans, investment and economic aid for loyalty to the US. These arguments were used to dispute Putin's strategy not only by Communists and other left forces but partly also by liberal parties and media; see N. Airapetova, ‘Kak Rossiya vyshla iz SNG’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 26 December 2001, http://ng.ru/cis/2001-12-26/5 about.html. The comments of Andrew Kuchins are transcribed in the Report of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ‘Is the US–Russia Partnership Working?’, 10 October 2002, http://www.ceip.org/files/events/2002-10-10-us-russia-tscript.asp.