The Structures of Practical Reason: Some Comments and Clarifications

THE STRUCTURES OF PRACTICAL REASON: SOME COMMENTS AND CLARIFICATIONS DR. BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE, C.Ss.R., pays particular attention to some of my early work in his recent article, " The Structures of Practical Reason: Traditional Theories and Contemporary Questions." 1 He plainly tries to present my views accurately. Still, Johnstone has overlooked some important things I said about the questions he considers. Moreover, in some cases he either misunderstands the positions I tried to explain and defend or, at least, puts matters in ways likely to cause others to misunderstand those positions . They still seem sound to me, although no doubt open to refinement and development. Therefore, since Johnstone is .seriously trying to use my work to advance understanding of important questions, I offer these comments and clarifications to help keep open the way to a more adequate theory of practical reason. I. The first question Johnstone considers is: What is the specific truth of practical reason? To explore this question, he compares the theory of practical reason which I articulated with a " traditional" theory, exemplified by the work of Labourdette. E·arly in this comparison, in pointing out differences , Johnstone offers a summary and criticism: If I understand Grisez correctly, he seeks to develop a theory of practical reason such that practical reason, in itself, can be understood -must be understood-without reference to the will FP,2 1 Tkomist, 50 (1986), pp. 417-46. Johnstone's article will be referred to henceforth as BVJ. 2 FP refers to: Germain Grisez, "The First Principle of Practical Reason : A Commentary on the Summa tkeologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2," 9t69 270 GERMAIN GRISEZ p. 193) . Further, he places such stress on the distinct way of knowing proper to practical reason, that he implies that the two (practical and theoretical reason) are quite disparate. These distinctions , I would suggest, are too sharply drawn. (BVJ, p. 4~5) I agree with Johnstone in rejecting these positions, for, as formulated, neither is what I tried to explain and defend. For practical reason precisely is reason directed to a work, which will not be done without an intervening act of an appetitive power corresponding to reason, and that power is the will. Hence, volition is included in the very concept of practical reason, and so it cannot be understood without reference to the will. But in the place Johnstone cites (FP, p. 193), I did not say that practical reason can be understood without reference to the wilL Rather, having argued that, because practical principles are self-evident truths, they do not presuppose a divine command, I said: "Nor is any operation of our own will presupposed by the first principles of practical reason." The argument for this is: The first operations of will are natural volitions of ends; these volitions presuppose knowledge directing to these ends; the directive knowledge is the principles of practical reason; therefore, the principles of practical reason do not presuppose any operation of our will.3 Moreover, I pointed out: "Of course we do make judgments concerning means in accordance with the orientation of our inNatural Law Forum, 10 (1965), pp. 168-201. Although I personally agreed with all of the propositions asserted in this article at the time I wrote it, and still agree with almost all of them, I did not and do not consider the theory proposed in it to be my theory, but that of St. Thomas (and, even more importantly, a very good theory) which I tried to understand, explain, and defend. Moreover, had the article not been a commentary, I would have put many things somewhat differently, and would have provided arguments for certain positions which can be taken for granted within the Thomistic framework. s In FP, p. 193, this argument is introduced by the sentence: "At any rate this is Aquinas's theory," and accompanied by references to his work, to signal the reader that assumptions are being made here which outside the Thomistic framework would require additional support. .Johnstone overlooks the signal. THE STRUCTURES OF PRACTICAL REASON 271 tention toward the end " (FP, p. 193) . One essential function of practical reason is to reach such judgments (concerning means), which...