Abstract Public support for judicial independence appears robust on principlein the abstract, but is it resilient? I argue that judicial rulings on identity-salient issues can weaken democratic forbearance by activating racial worldviews that motivate citizens to perceive judges as biased, rationalizing undemocratic penalties. I test this theory using two survey experiments (White and Latino samples) that randomly assign conditions varying the decision direction and the judge’s race. A dual-baseline-design comparing a consensus policy control against a neutral decision shows that disliked decisions move both racial liberals and conservatives from undemocratic penalties’ rejection toward ambivalence. The effects are symmetric within partisan groups. Perceived judicial bias mediates the relationship, but only among those with strong racial commitments. Among Latinos, the bias-to-penalty process generalizes, but the triggers differ: racial resentment captures anti-Black distancing not defense of White symbols. Findings suggest that public support for judicial independence is conditional on substantive agreement and vulnerable to elite exploitation.
Alexandra Filindra (Tue,) studied this question.