Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine how configurations of project structure, risk allocation, and procurement competition influence the financing capacity of U.S. toll-road public–private partnership (PPP) investments. Design/methodology/approach The relationships among capital value, concession term, construction risk, traffic risk, and competition level are analyzed using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) of 24 U.S. transportation PPP projects delivered over the past 2 decades. Project attributes are calibrated into fuzzy membership scores based on financial and contractual data and evaluated against three financing outcomes: reduced equity return, reduced debt spread and maximized leverage ratio. Findings Results suggest that financing performance does not depend on isolated variables but on specific combinations of conditions. High competition, low traffic risk, and manageable construction exposure are consistently associated with lower equity costs, narrower debt spreads, and higher leverage. When equity sponsors also act as builders, construction risk is internalized through construction profit, reallocating returns within the project rather than raising the cost of equity. Traffic risk remains the principal constraint for lenders. Two configurations associated with financing failure are also identified, particularly small-scale projects combining short concession terms and high traffic exposure. Originality/value The paper contributes to PPP finance research by reframing financing capacity as a configurational outcome emerging from interacting contractual and market conditions rather than a linear response to individual risk factors. It provides systematic cross-case evidence identifying both successful financing pathways and “no-deal” structures in U.S. transportation PPPs, offering practical guidance for structuring financially viable concessions.
Zhang et al. (Wed,) studied this question.