Nietzsche’s Nihilisms

Abstract For Nietzsche, we can regard our life as worth living only if we overcome the threat of nihilism. However, it is difficult to determine the nature of this threat since he characterizes the stance of nihilism in multiple, rather different and seemingly incompatible ways. This essay attempts to shed light on this issue by distinguishing three key forms of nihilism that figure centrally in Nietzsche’s thinking and pose different challenges to life affirmation: ‘ascetic’ nihilism (embodied, for instance, by Christianity or Buddhism); value nihilism (the impression that life lacks value and meaning); and ‘anthropaedic’ nihilism (disgust with – specifically modern – humanity). I argue that Nietzsche perceives anthropaedic nihilism as the gravest danger and that he has no effective response to it. Thus, his key philosophical project of life-affirmation remains (at least to some extent) unsuccessful.