This paper defines as R-ealism the tacit ontology on which the world is exhaustively describable, and argues for the structural limit this position meets when it carries its own inner logic to the end. R-ealism equates being real with being formally describable—with R-describability as its representative form—and has run through both the natural science and the metaphysics of the modern period. But this dominance comes at a price. However precisely we describe an object, the description always leaves a surplus that has not yet risen into meaning; a description can record what has already taken shape, but can never contain the very arising by which that shape comes to be. R-ealism has banished this surplus outside the real as "something subjective" or as "an appearance to be explained away in due course." Pursued to its limit, R-ealism runs up against the non-closure of description: in three regions—experience, meaning, and event—description necessarily fails to capture the arising that precedes its result. As a framework that positions this surplus without negating R-ealism, the paper sketches Extended Imaginary Number Theory (Z = D + iD; Muranushi 2026a) and proposes Extended Realism, which restores that surplus as the imaginary dimension iD on the side of the real. The conclusion: R-ealism is not false, but narrow.
Yuma Muranushi (Sat,) studied this question.