Bangladesh's tax-to-GDP ratio is among the lowest in the world, estimated at roughly 6.5-7.5% in recent fiscal years and reported by the World Bank at 8.2% as recently as 2024 depending on the measure and year used; NBR's own data showed the ratio falling to 6.56% in FY25 from 7.2% in FY241. Bangladesh's own Medium and Long-Term Revenue Strategy (2025-2035) targets raising this to 10.5% by FY35 2, an explicit acknowledgement from NBR itself that current collection is far short of what the country needs. Despite legislative reform through the VAT and Supplementary Duty Act 2012 (implemented 1 July 2019) 3, compliance at the retail and service level continues to be weak. Enforcement-led approaches have yielded limited returns, constrained by NBR capacity and the size of the informal economy. The idea here is to shift VAT enforcement from the supply side to the demand side: give consumers a direct financial reason to demand proper VAT documentation at the point of sale. The mechanism pairs an instant cashback — funded through a real-time escrow that ringfences VAT the moment payment is made — with an annual tax rebate for registered taxpayers tied to verified VAT spending.What follows is a concept note, not a feasibility study, and it is meant to be argued with. The cashback rate, the projected compliance uplift, the rebate cap, the rollout sequencing — these are working assumptions chosen to make the idea concrete enough to critique, not settled parameters. Several are flagged as untested where they appear. A fiscal microsimulation, a legal drafting review, and a capacity-building plan would all need to happen before anyone decided to pilot this; none of that work exists yet. Where the note leans on international examples, the citations are there so a reader can check them and push back.
Muhammmad Zakiruddin Chowdhury (Fri,) studied this question.