Abstract Using developments in EU–China research cooperation between 2021 and 2025 as an empirical window, this article examines how the EU’s de-risking agenda is reconfiguring research governance through the securitisation of knowledge exchange. Drawing on securitisation theory and a qualitative analysis of publicly available EU policy documents—including the Horizon Europe regulation and participation rules (Articles 22(5)– (6)), the European Economic Security Strategy, and the 2024 Council Recommendation on enhancing research security—alongside Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) readouts and state-media commentaries, the article traces how “research security” is constructed and operationalised. It finds that EU actors increasingly frame knowledge flows with China as strategically sensitive, and translate this framing into a growing toolkit of eligibility rules, risk screening, and guidance on foreign interference and safeguarding. Empirically, the analysis identifies a dual trajectory at the level of governance: established cooperation architectures and dialogues largely persist, yet are increasingly overlaid with security-oriented constraints that tighten eligibility and risk parameters for collaboration. In parallel, Chinese actors mobilise counter-narratives of openness, reciprocity, and “opportunity rather than risk,” seeking to contest the legitimacy of EU securitising moves and to re-politicise the costs of over-securitisation. The article contributes to debates on geoeconomics and science diplomacy by specifying how de-risking is institutionalised in research governance, and by highlighting narrative contestation as a constitutive element of knowledge securitisation.
Yang et al. (Wed,) studied this question.
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