By providing appropriate long-term compensation incentives to corporate executives, companies can motivate them to make innovative investments, ensuring companies maintain an optimal risk-taking level. This is crucial for the long-term development of the company. This study uses data from Chinese A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2022 as a sample and employs Stata 17 software to investigate the impact of long-term executive compensation on the corporate risk-taking level. Additionally, the study examines the mediating role of corporate innovation investment in the relationship between long-term executive compensation and the corporate risk-taking level. The findings provide direct empirical evidence for listed companies implementing long-term incentive plans for executives and deepen the application of agency theory in the context of risk-taking.
Jiang Yuyang (Sun,) studied this question.
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