Despite transitioning from a one-child policy (1979–2015) to a universal two-child policy in 2016 and a three-child policy in 2021, China’s birth rate has continued to decline. These policy changes, rooted in the assumption of high-fertility preferences influenced by Confucian familism, did not result in an anticipated increase in birth rates. Using a three-level policy design, this study estimates the impact of Confucian familism on fertility intention using instrumental variables. Data were drawn from the “Tianjin Citizen Fertility Willingness Survey” of the Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences ( n = 655 women, aged 15–49). First, the results reveal that although Confucian ideals that encourage childbearing have been widely accepted; however, fertility intentions (i.e., the expected number of children) remain low. Second, despite controlling for fertility burdens and policy changes in the estimations, we observed that stronger adherence to Confucian familism does not significantly predict greater fertility intentions. However, such strong adherence may be associated with a greater willingness to have only one child. The results suggest that the inclination to have a single child, even under incentive-based birth policies, arises from an ultracompetitive society that lacks comprehensive social welfare guarantees.
Yalei Zhai (Thu,) studied this question.