The Balance of Authority in Iraq Between the Parliament and the Government and Its Impact on Political Stability

This research aims to examine the nature of the balance of authority in Iraq between the legislative authority (Parliament) and the executive authority (Government), and its impact on political stability. According to the 2005 Iraqi Constitution, the system is based on the principle of a flexible separation of powers, whereby Parliament grants legitimacy to the Government and monitors its performance, while the Government manages the state and implements laws. In practice, however, this balance is affected by the reality of sectarian and partisan quota-sharing, which makes the relationship between the two authorities dependent more on political agreements than on institutional cooperation. This has led to weak harmony between them and the emergence of recurring crises, such as the obstruction of legislation and the collapse or weakening of governments due to parliamentary conflicts. Accordingly, the balance of authority in Iraq has, on one hand, contributed to preventing the return of authoritarianism by strengthening parliamentary oversight, but on the other hand, it has weakened political stability and exposed the political system to continuous rivalries among political forces. This research addresses the issue of the balance of authority in Iraq between the legislative and executive authorities, and the direct implications of this balance on political stability. The 2005 Iraqi Constitution enshrined the principle of flexible separation of powers, enabling the Council of Representatives to perform its legislative and oversight roles, and the Government to exercise its executive and administrative functions within the constitutional legitimacy derived from Parliament. However, the political reality has shown that this balance has not been achieved in the intended institutional form. The post-2003 environment produced a system based on sectarian and partisan quota-sharing, which has made the relationship between Parliament and the Government subject to political agreements rather than constitutional standards. This situation has affected the functioning of both institutions: Parliament has often employed its legislative and oversight authority within the framework of political competition among blocs, while successive governments have remained hostage to the understandings of major blocs, which has restricted their independence in formulating and implementing public policies. As a result, recurring political crises have emerged, reflected in the obstruction of key legislation, the withdrawal of confidence from governments or ministers, and repeated political deadlocks that have hindered the stability of the political process.