Pro‐EU MEPs pursue a strategy to further democratise EU governance through initiatives such as the Spitzenkandidaten and transnational lists. Doing so, they seem to follow a logic of what we call “trickle‐down democracy,” which entails the belief that the reproduction of domestic representative democracy at the EU level will increase popular support for the EU. However, despite extensive increases in power and authority for Parliament, popular support has not significantly increased, while Euroscepticism has become a mainstream phenomenon. When did pro‐EU MEPs commit to a “trickle‐down” logic of democratisation? And did they remain wedded to this logic despite strong counterindications? In this article, we adopt a historical institutionalist perspective to answer these questions. Based on a qualitative, interpretive thematic analysis of European Parliament (EP) debates and resolutions, we demonstrate that in the 1970s, when in anticipation of the first direct EP elections the blueprint of European democracy was debated, pro‐EU MEPs debated different models and ultimately decided to follow the path of trickle‐down democracy. We then show that this choice was reinstated rather than revisited following Maastricht, as growing Euroscepticism in EU politics did not trigger the critical juncture historical institutionalism could expect.
Beetz et al. (Thu,) studied this question.
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