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Discussion critiques the link between skepticism in epistemology and political conservatism, suggesting it may not hold.
In a new book, Jonathan Ichikawa argues that contemporary epistemology promotes a sceptical attitude towards belief, and by doing so it lends inadvertent support to political conservatism. This very brief discussion note argues that the default scepticism Ichikawa identifies has no such political implications. First, Ichikawa is incorrect in identifying the political right with Burkean conservatism. In fact, the right is innovative, and scepticism might as easily oppose as support its innovations. Second, even if Burkean conservatism were dominant, it relies on a selective scepticism, and the scepticism that Ichikawa finds to be characteristic of epistemology is unselective. I argue that this pervasive scepticism might in fact be a useful corrective to folk scepticism, which is more selective.
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Neil Levy (2025) studied this question.
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