Analysis of future contingency by Ibn Sīnā shows ontic and epistemic openness in propositions, suggesting implications for truth-values.
Analysing the theory of future contingency that Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna) has developed in chapter I.10 of his The Interpretation (Al-ʿIbāra from the logic part of Al-Shifāʾ) and criticising the rival interpretations of this chapter, I argue that, according to him, the future is open not only epistemically but also ontically and alethically. This means that there are future propositions expressing future states of affairs whose occurrence or nonoccurrence is not yet settled. Such a proposition does not have a settled truth-value. It is neither true nor false. Accordingly, neither such a proposition nor its negation can be known.
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Mohammad Saleh Zarepour (2025) studied this question.
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