Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol With Forward Secrecy for Securing Cyber Physical Systems

As Internet of Things (IoT) technologies become increasingly embedded within cyber-physical systems (CPS), safeguarding communications and protecting data have emerged as significant challenges. Existing authenticated key agreement protocols play a fundamental role in securing these systems, but many fail to provide adequate protection against evolving security threats, particularly in terms of forward secrecy. This paper conducts an in-depth cryptanalysis of a newly introduced authentication protocol, highlighting its failure to provide forward secrecy-a crucial feature that maintains communication confidentiality even in the event that the long-term key is exposed. Through detailed analysis, we identify several vulnerabilities within the protocol, particularly its inability to withstand attacks targeting session key exposure. Building on these findings, we propose a new authenticated key agreement protocol specifically designed to enhance security in CPS environments. Our proposed protocol integrates forward secrecy, ensuring that even if an attacker gains access to a device's long-term key, communications remain protected. The protocol aims to deliver robust security assurances with minimal computational demands, rendering it particularly wellsuited for IoT devices with limited resources. Our evaluation assesses its security, efficiency, and scalability, and the results indicate that it outperforms current alternatives. The proposed protocol offers a robust, forward secrecy-enabled solution for securing CPS communications, providing a solid foundation for the future of secure IoT networks in critical applications.