Military interventions in the political arena and internal affairs of African states without a clearly defined legal framework, roles, and extent of their operations pose a significant threat to democratic governance and constitutionalism in the continent. This study therefore sought to determine the military interests and related factors that make the military intervene in political transitions in Africa. The study adopted Feaver’s Agency Theory as its theoretical framework. The theory emphasises the distinct preferences and the roles of the military and civilian leaders in shaping military interventions. This study utilised a mixed-method research design, entailing both quantitative and qualitative techniques. The study was conducted in eight African countries that have had coups: Sudan, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Uganda, Mali, Sierra Leone, Gabon and Niger. A sample size of 48 respondents was drawn from the study’s target population (military officers and commanders, members of parliament, representatives from the Attorney General’s office, the general public and scholars in the fields of political science, international relations, and security studies). Purposive sampling was used to identify the countries and the respondents to be included in the study. Primary data for this study was obtained using interviews. The study also relied on secondary data which was obtained from pertinent literature in the field of study, including journals, books, essays, policy papers, government reports, conference proceedings, and other publications. Content analysis was used to analyse qualitative data and identify emerging themes pertaining to military interests in their political involvement, while descriptive statistics was computed for quantitative data. Excel sheet, NVivo, QDAS, and SPSS will be used to aid data analysis in this research. The study utilized graphs and tables to exhibit and evaluate quantitative data. From the study’s findings, military intervention in the political affairs of African nations is primarily necessitated by military corporate interests and a confluence of interlinked factors such as historical precedents, economic downturn, legitimacy crises, poor governance or weak political institutions, and terrorism. Consequently, the study recommends coup-proofing mechanisms that bolster regional security organisations and promote cooperative efforts in addressing security threats, reinforce the principle of civilian control over the military through legal and institutional mechanisms, and strengthen political institutions and governance.
Robert Ngesu (Wed,) studied this question.