In this paper, I give a response to the objections against the naturalistic argument for theismproposed in my paper “Diversity of religious experience and justification of theism:thechallenge of Voodoo epistemology”. In response to Vladimir Shokhin’s claim, I arguethat even if the choice of religion is a matter of personal taste, it does not make theisticbelievers immune to the problem of religious diversity. Next, in response to VladimirShokhin’s and MatveySysoev’s objections, I demonstrate that naturalism is compatible witha theistic worldview. The claim that our actions and beliefs are predetermined is in line withthe doctrine of predetermination found in various versions of classical theism, and the beliefthat God is a non-physical cause of the world does not contradict the principle of causal clo-sure. I criticize Igor Gasparov’s claim that Voodoo beliefs can be defeated without natura-lism and his suggestions about the physical nature of spirits. I demonstrate that naturalisticarguments for theism make sense in the context of both externalism and internalism. React-ing to Gasparov’s arguments, I discuss how it is possible to form justified beliefs aboutcausally inert entities such as mathematical objects and spirits if we accept both theism andnaturalism. Finally, I examine whether the hypothetical belief in the team of creating spiritsput forward by Sysoev could meet a naturalistic condition to become a viable alternativetotheism.
Alexander V. Khramov (2025) studied this question.