Collingwood and Margaret Hattersley Bulley, Understanding Art: The Case for Examples

Some readers of R. G. Collingwood's The Principles of Art have complained about his lack of examples in explaining his concepts. One was Margaret Hattersley Bulley. He gave no response to her letter. What I develop may be considered a reply on his behalf. The two are at odds on this point because of their disciplines: she is an art historian whose subject is example-driven, and he as a philosopher sees it as warranted by the argument at hand. So, the two pass one another by. However, this situation raises an interesting question. In an argumentative context, when are examples appropriate? When examples are missing, the argument could be considered informally fallacious, argumentum sine exempli or argument without examples. Neither Bulley nor Collingwood committed this fallacy, but others have. Consequently, this is worth exploring. Examples are not just rhetorical devices but actual supporting premises in an art-historical or art-critical argument. Collingwood gives several examples of this type of argument, as does Bulley in her books, so these are examined in some detail. Cézanne is central to both of their endeavors, so a close look at his theory of painting is given. On one hand, Bulley has a Platonic view of art with an emphasis on the “Idea,” which is closely associated with spiritual harmony. Collingwood, on the other hand, sees art proper as expression (of emotion) and especially (the product of) imagination and not art as craft, as magic, and as amusement. Although both Bulley and Collingwood may be considered idealists, they are about as far apart as you can get conceptually.