Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, the extremist group “Hayat Tahrir al-Sham” (HTS) and associated quasi-state structures came to power in Syria. Prior to seizing power, HTS had gained certain experience of territorial governance in the Idlib province that it had partly controlled (and in the respective “Idlib de-escalation zone” that had been established by an agreement between Russia and Turkey). Once in power, the quasi-state bodies promptly extrapolated this experience to much of Syria’s territory, preventing the full paralysis of the state system and at the same time refraining from strictly implementing Shariah norms in the legal field. The article considers the main reasons for the departure of the group, originally affiliated with Al-Qaeda, from the ideology of Salafi jihadism and its shift to traditions of more moderate Islamism. The author examines the experience of HTS’ localization and the evolution of the faction’s approaches to governance through the prism of the “Syrianization” personnel policy, public military and political reforms, and media activity. He shows how the new Syrian authorities – first, the interim government and, then, the transitional government – have flexibly implemented the lessons learnt on a national scale. However, the author concludes that, despite public statements about the liberalization of the sociopolitical order, the new leadership tends to hypercentralize power, out of the fear of a possible new coup d’tat, as it maneuvers between moderate and radical groups within the system.
Anton Mardasov (Wed,) studied this question.