A Strength Allocation Bayesian Game Method for Swarming Unmanned Systems

This paper investigates a swarming strength allocation Bayesian game approach under incomplete information to address the high-value targets protection problem of swarming unmanned systems. The swarming strength allocation Bayesian game model is established by analyzing the non-zero sum incomplete information game mechanism during the protection process, considering high-tech and low-tech interception players. The model incorporates a game benefit quantification method based on an improved Lanchester equation. The method regards massive swarm individuals as a collective unit for overall cost calculation, thus avoiding the curse of dimensionality from increasing numbers of individuals. Based on it, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium solving approach is presented to determine the optimal swarming strength allocation for the protection player. Finally, compared with random allocation, greedy heuristic, rule-based assignment, and Colonel Blotto game, the simulations demonstrate the proposed method’s robustness in large-scale strength allocation.