Possibilities for a Relational Theory of Autonomy for Care Ethics: Adam Smith on Self-Interest and the Social Formation of Morality

While Smith does not explicitly refer to autonomy, it has been argued that in the Smithean individual there is a place for agency and self-determination, as portrayed in the Theory of Moral Sentiments. In this paper, I contend that the Smithian perspective on moral action encompasses self-interest and a relational perspective of the formation of morality as integral components of autonomy. This conceptualization bears resemblance to the notion of relational autonomy as expounded in care ethics. In Smith’s framework, morality is a product of societal interactions facilitated by the sympathetic process and the impartial spectator, that lead individuals to emerge as moral subjects. The interplay of sympathy, self-interest, society, and the conception of the individual as delineated in TMS could provide a robust foundation for a theory of relational autonomy that integrates the social, as care ethics proposes, and that does not sacrifice justice and individual rights.