This analysis explores the standards of identity in names by Kongzi, Mengzi, and Gongsun Longzi, suggesting significant differences in their theories.
This paper aims to bring to light the significance of Kongzi’s theory on rectifying names by comparing the theories on names of the philosophers Kongzi, Mengzi, Xunzi, and Gongsun Longzi. Different scholars have discussed their theories on rectification of names as variants of one-name-one-object theory, differing in strictness. However, this paper contends that the above mentioned philosophers have respective standards for judging the identity of the object, making it more of a difference of standard rather than varying degrees of strictness. When compared to theories of Xunzi who discusses the different shapes of the object, and Gongsun Longzi who introduces the concept of differing levels of significance in a single noun, it becomes clear that Kongzi’s theory centers on the concept of virtue as the standard for judgment of rectification. Kongzi’s theory of names is closely related to his political philosophy that a ruler should cultivate his moral perfection in order to win and maintain the title of a ruler.
No takes yet. Share an insight, caveat, or question.
Dan B. Jung (2025) studied this question.
Synapse has enriched 5 closely related papers on similar clinical questions. Consider them for comparative context: