Parallel Disputes, Divergent Outcomes: The EU's Automobile Trade Conflicts with Korea and China

Since the vulnerability of the EU's automobile industry, trade disputes have arisen between the EU and both Korea and China over automobile imports. Using the theory of “two‐level game” that emphasizes domestic politics as an analytical framework, this paper analyzes the game strategies and internal influences of the three parties in the two trade disputes between Korea and the EU, and between China and the EU. The study shows that the EU has adopted trade protection measures in both disputes for its industrial vulnerability, but the policy framework of the ROK‐EU FTA, the difference in the international situation, and China's role made the EU adopt different strategies for the two countries, and Trump's reelection also added new changes. At the last, the paper analyzed the reasons of the increasing of protectionism within the EU, and identifies three core considerations in the EU’s trade decision‐making. Additionally, the paper offers policy implications that emphasize the importance of FTAs, internal EU differences, and the need for diversified markets and industrial layout.