This article examines the relationship between political separations of power and technology innovation in China’s nuclear energy industry. It is argued that the fragmented technocracy in energy governance has resulted in the multiplicity of technology innovation strategies. Existing studies find state-dominant nuclear technology development such as the case of Russia leads to closely integrated military and civilian nuclear industry, because the core competencies of the military nuclear program facilitate to preserve the innovative technological potentials for the civilian nuclear industry. However, this is not the situation in China. Although China’s civilian nuclear energy industry comprises solely state-owned enterprises, China has separated its civil nuclear industry from the military after a series of institutional reforms. The case studies in this article reveal that competing governmental agencies and three state-owned nuclear companies (the “three sons”) that monopolize the industry have produced multiple types of technology innovation strategies and repeatedly frustrated the central leadership’s attempts to unify the country’s technology pathways for nuclear energy. Even in a centralized authoritarian regime, according to the findings, industrial policy making and implementation can considerably accommodate a variety of interests and bargaining. This research contributes to a broader academic debate on the roles of political institutions in public policy making and technology innovation.
Dan Wu (Sun,) studied this question.
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