This paper examines Pericles’ defensive strategy during the Peloponnesian War, focusing on his strategic vision centered on the “Long Walls” system and naval supremacy, its implementation, and its impact on Athens’ short- and long-term fate. Drawing on primary sources such as Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War and contemporary research, the study evaluates the strategy’s merits and shortcomings from military, economic, political, and social perspectives. The research indicates that Pericles’ strategy effectively repelled Spartan land forces and safeguarded Athens in the short term. However, it also led to problems such as overcrowding triggering epidemics, severe depletion of fiscal resources, and lagging development of the land forces. Long-term consequences included an imbalance in Athens’ military structure and distorted risk assessments, which in turn prompted later leadership to undertake radical and risky ventures (such as the Sicilian Expedition), ultimately exacerbating Athens’ strategic failure. Through a comparative analysis of Athenian and Spartan strategies, the paper highlights differences in resource allocation, warfare methods, and endurance in protracted conflicts. It distills historical lessons with implications for modern strategic planning, focusing on balancing offense and defense, enhancing strategic adaptability, optimizing resource allocation, and expanding threat perception. This paper argues that Pericles’ strategy not only reflects the strategic logic of classical city-state warfare but also provides a crucial case study for understanding the limitations of defensive strategies in protracted conflicts.
Yongan Zhu (Thu,) studied this question.