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A recent trend towards running more demanding web applications, such as video games or client-side LLMs, in the browser has led to the adoption of the WebGPU standard that provides a cross-platform API exposing the GPU to websites. This opens up a new attack surface: Untrusted web content is passed through to the GPU stack, which traditionally has been optimized for performance instead of security. Worsening the problem, most of WebGPU cannot be run in the tightly sandboxed process that manages other web content, which eases the attacker's path to compromising the client machine. Contrasting its importance, WebGPU shader processing has received surprisingly little attention from the automated testing community. Part of the reason is that shader translators expect highly structured and statically typed input, which renders typical fuzzing mutations ineffective. Complicating testing further, shader translation consists of a complex multi-step compilation pipeline, each stage presenting unique requirements and challenges.
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Bernhard et al. (2024) studied this question.
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