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Abstract The Māturīdīs think that, without revealed law, human beings can grasp through speculative reasoning that some actions are good ( ḥasan ) and some are bad ( qabīḥ ). This article addresses the ontological aspect of such ethical rationalism. An analysis of the texts of legal theory shows that the sixth/twelfth-century Māturīdīs approached moral values in a non-realist way. Specifically, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 539/1144?), who identifies himself as a true successor of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944), demonstrates that goodness ( ḥusn ) and badness ( qubḥ ) are neither real accidents nor divine command and prohibition; rather, “good” and “bad” just express one’s natural or rational approval and disapproval of objects and actions, and Prophetic law shapes some of the natural likes and dislikes. On this account, I conclude that al-Samarqandī’s view, shared by his contemporaneous fellow Māturīdīs such as Abū l-Thanāʾ al-Lāmishī (d. after 539/1144) and Najm al-Dīn al-Nasafī (d. 537/1142), challenges the current standard interpretations of the Māturīdī ethics as realism or divine command theory.
Hisashi Obuchi (2024) studied this question.