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ABSTRACT: With the rise of bonded private debt over the past 15 years, there is an increased dependency on private creditors for sovereign nations that borrow to finance their government activities. The power of private creditors gained through increased sovereign debt burdens is affecting the internal political dynamics of these borrower countries, especially in the Global South, including Latin America. A larger external debt burden creates internal political conflict around the distribution of benefits, so debt is intimately linked with politics. Standard economics literature ignores this problem by hypothesizing markets based on perfect competition. We outline a set of hypotheses regarding the relationship between creditors' political preferences in sovereign debt markets that feature "power rents," when relatively powerful foreign investors can obtain significantly higher returns by lending to smaller, weaker nations. Bringing power asymmetries into the debt discussion, we also present a research agenda for economics and political science.
Guzmán et al. (Sun,) studied this question.