Evolution of the Balance of Power in Northeast Asia: Implications for Regional Status Quo

The article examines the influence of the balance of power on the status quo existing around the Korean Peninsula in Northeast Asia since the summer of 1953. The status quo that emerged then still exists. On July 27, 1953, an Agreement was signed on a temporary truce in the Korean war, signed on the part of the DPRK by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, Marshal of the DPRK Kim Il Sung and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, General of the People's Liberation Army of China, General Peng De Huai, and on the part of the "UN troops "American General A. Clark. The Republic of Korea, a participant in that war, did not sign the Armistice Agreement either then or subsequently. The signatories of the Armistice Agreement represented their states and agreed to sign it because they understood the impossibility of victory in the Korean War due to the generally equal strength of the warring parties. It reflected the balance of power that had developed in the region by that time. Since then, there have been repeated attempts to somehow change it, on the one hand, and to keep it unchanged, on the other. Both supporters of changing the status quo and opponents of such a measure had their own reasons. This issue is especially acute now due to the significant change in the balance of power in the region to date.