More or Less Borrell? A Critical Analysis of Josep Borrell as the European Union's High Representative

This article reviews Josep Borrell's tenure as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) from December 2019 to June 2024. It focuses on his efforts to enhance the European Union's (EU's) global influence and stability amid challenges such as Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic, the invasion of Ukraine, shifting EU policies towards China and the United States and the conflict in Gaza. Key EU policies during this period include the Strategic Compass in defence and REPowerEU in energy security. In surveying these policies, the article examines Borrell's effectiveness in mediating foreign policy responses from EU member states and fostering a unified stance during crises. It further explores how Borrell's approach enabled him to maintain or enhance his leadership role through the 'performance' of key policies like REPowerEU, reflecting 'leaderisation' (Aggestam and Hedling, 2020). Leaderisation in this sense involves leaders engaging in sense-making of their role to connect with different audiences (Aggestam and Hedling, 2020, p. 306). Borrell's successes and challenges provide insights into the EU's capacity to develop a cohesive foreign policy framework and influence regional and global politics. We conclude that Borrell's tenure involved both tacit and active contributions, from moderate efforts to advance Commission President von der Leyen's 2019 'Geopolitical Commission' agenda during Brexit and COVID-19 to successful alignment of energy policy with EU foreign policy and a unified response to the invasion of Ukraine. The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, effective May 1999, established the position of High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, initially held by Javier Solana. Solana's role was more limited than today's HR/VP as defined by the Treaty of Lisbon (European Parliament, 2009). Solana's tenure shaped the role for future HR/VPs by balancing member states' differing foreign policy views with a value-based approach, enabling the EU to act effectively (Helwig, 2015, p. 87). In his term, he stressed the importance of aligning EU responses to global events, particularly in complex regions like the Western Balkans. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty expanded and clarified the HR/VP role a bit further. Veteran British politician Catherine Ashton was the first to hold this expanded position. She oversaw the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), balancing member state sensitivities with the need for coherence in EU foreign policy. Ashton's behind-the-scenes consensus-building methods enhanced the HR/VP role's capacity to strengthen relations between the Council, Commission and EEAS and secure successive rounds of sanctions (Tallberg, 2006). Federica Mogherini, who succeeded Ashton in 2014, developed the EU's first global strategy since the 2003 European Security Strategy. Mogherini's expertise in authoring the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) was symbiotic to her leadership style, described by Aggestam and Hedling as 'leadership as an ongoing process of performance', involving key policy artefacts and the use of performative acts in the launch and promotion of key policies. As discussed later, Borrell's own use of REPowerEU mirrors Mogherini's approach, but is starkly contrasted with that of the Strategic Compass (Novotná, 2015). Following the 2019 EU elections, Borrell, an experienced politician with a background in both national and European politics, succeeded Mogherini in the office. Borrell, like his HR/VP predecessors, hailed from the political left, having begun his political career in the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) in the 1970s and being closely associated with Spain's transition to democracy as a member of the PSOE. At the national level, he served as the General Secretary for the Budget and Public Spending from 1982 to 1984 and as the Secretary of State for Finance from 1984 to 1991. He then became a member of the Council of Ministers as the Minister of Public Works and Transport from 1991 to 1996. Following the 1996 election, Borrell won the PSOE primary in 1998 and became the Leader of the Opposition until his resignation in 1999. He served as a member of the Spanish Parliament, representing Barcelona, from 1986 to 2004. He subsequently shifted his focus to European politics, serving as a Member of the European Parliament (MEP) during the 2004–2009 legislative session and as President of the European Parliament until 2007. Afterwards, he returned to national politics and was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the EU and Cooperation in the Sánchez government in June 2018. However, his return to national Spanish politics was short-lived. In July 2019, the European Council nominated him for the position of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP), and he took office in December 2019 (Socialists A Europe Fit for the Digital Age, promoting digital transformation; An Economy that Works for People, fostering economic growth and job creation; Promoting Our European Way of Life, safeguarding EU values; A Stronger Europe in the World, enhancing the EU's global role; and A New Push for European Democracy, strengthening democratic processes and protecting against external threats. These six strategies are crucial in evaluating the EU's foreign policy effectiveness or ineffectiveness, Borrell's own ability as HR/VP to position the EU as a responsive, materially capable and diplomatically credible global actor and the overlap – and possible conflation – of EU external engagement between Borrell as HR/VP and EEAS chief on the one side and von der Leyen as Commission President on the other. Throughout his tenure, Borrell has witnessed a series of major global events through which he has tried to forge a unified EU foreign policy. The Commission's response to the COVID-19 crisis at the beginning of 2020 was poorly co-ordinated, with unclear leadership and ineffective regional and global articulation by the HR/VP. The situation worsened with the slow vaccine delivery under von der Leyen's procurement programme (Fleming, 2023). However, the joint proposal by French President Macron and German Chancellor Merkel for a recovery fund led to the NextGenerationEU, a €750 billion initiative marking progress towards EU fiscal integration and collective action. This allowed the EU to swiftly implement measures including rapid vaccine development and distribution through the EU's vaccine strategy, the establishment of the NextGenerationEU recovery fund and enhanced global aid through the COVAX programme. This demonstrated the EU's ability to lead co-ordinated health and economic strategies at regional and even global levels and, subsequently, to integrate health crises into its own public and foreign policy framework (Bartzokas et al., 2022). In 'European Foreign Policy in Times of COVID-19', Borrell described NextGenerationEU as a critical turning point for the EU, emphasising its role in limiting additional debt from the crisis and viewing the virus as an external enemy requiring a collective response (Institute for New Economic Thinking, 2020). Borrell argued that NextGenerationEU significantly enhanced Europe's global standing and stressed the need for improved co-ordination to address future crises, avoid internal conflicts and maintain credibility. This has been a lesson for the EU's future crises. In 2021, still in the teeth of regional upheaval sparked by the pandemic and a few months before the full-fledged invasion of Ukraine, the EEAS produced a document entitled the Strategic Compass, designed to evaluate the EU's security and defence environment, identify explicit and tacit threats to the EU and explore opportunities to enhance the EU's strategic autonomy. Touted by the EEAS (2022a) and Borrell alike as 'an ambitious plan of action for strengthening the EU's security and defence policy by 2030', and following months of debate by EU foreign ministers, Borrell was instrumental in having the Strategic Compass quickly adopted as the EU's officially updated official strategy in late March 2022, less than a month after the invasion of Ukraine. Europe is in danger …. The purpose of the Strategic Compass is to draw an assessment of the threats and challenges we face and propose operational guidelines to enable the European Union to become a security provider for its citizens, protecting its values and interests. (Borrell, 2021, in EEAS, 2022b) Cautioning against treating the Strategic Compass as 'just another EU paper' with limited practical follow-through, Borrell outlined his concern that without strong implementation and member state buy-in, the policy would fail to live up to its strategic promises. Reviewing the strategy, Witney (2022) argued that the Compass 'underlines the collective action problem at the heart of European attempts to pool defence efforts and resources: everyone agrees that closer integration is essential, but everyone wants someone else to go first'. The Compass is therefore something of a paradox. It is singularly radical on the one hand in being able to kickstart EU co-ordination, but possibly overly bureaucratic in effectively leveraging the minimum member state collaboration required. It outlines Borrell's requirement for the EU to operate 'in a collaborative way and not in a fragmented, national manner' to confront 'the costs of inaction – of "non-Europe"', and the need for 'a quantum leap forward on security and defence'; yet it is 'full of the usual process-heavy gradualism, to be implemented over a decade and wrapped in conventional reflections on the dangerous world we live in and the ever-popular bromides about the EU's need to "partner" with all and sundry' (Witney, 2022). Indeed, from a chronological perspective, the Strategic Compass appears to have been awkwardly overlaid with the onset of the war in Ukraine, the conflict itself serving to justify retrospectively the EU's perceived threat environment and the intense limitations of EU defence capabilities. From a positive perspective, the Russian invasion of Ukraine provided the EU with an ideal, if bittersweet, opportunity to at last lock in its strategic blueprint as a senior strategic partner in Europe, in co-ordination with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), laying out structures by which to accelerate member states' and EU institutional commitment and deepen co-ordination mechanisms. … we cannot rely on the American support and on the American capacity to protect us. We have to build our common defence capacity. But inside NATO we have to build a strong European pillar. A war is not going to start tomorrow against us. But, we cannot deny the reality: a rising competition among big powers, high intensity conflicts between states, weaponisation of economic interdependency, cyber warfare and disinformation are part of our reality. (EEAS, 2024) If the Strategic Compass proves to be the policy blueprint that finally catalyses the EU's ability to move from crisis-induced 'strategic responsibility' to operable forms of strategic autonomy in key areas including defence and perhaps energy security, then Borrell's role at HR/VP in articulating this opportunity may remain as part of his 'leaderised' legacy. If not, the Compass may fade from sight or morph into the sequence of EU strategic policies. In February 2021, Borrell visited Russia, the first occasion that an EU High Representative had visited the country since 2017. Set against the backdrop of heightened tensions surrounding the poisoning and subsequent arrest of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, Borrell's visit – riddled with diplomatic gaffes and clumsy approaches – was castigated by MEPs as a 'predictable mistake', 'ill-advised', 'ill-executed' and, for some, 'a complete disaster' (EuroNews, 2021). One year later, Borrell was on the front foot, with the EU's handling of the invasion of Ukraine deemed a critical success in EU foreign policy, characterised by decisive and unified actions. Within days of the invasion, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Borrell issued a joint statement condemning Russia's 'barbaric attack' on Ukraine (European Commission Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, 2022). Beyond Ukraine, this war has precipitated a severe energy crisis in Europe, stemming from Russia's strategic use of energy as a weapon. Vladimir Putin evidently believed that the EU's significant reliance on Russian fossil fuels, especially gas, would create divisions within the EU and hinder its support for Ukraine. Anticipating the conflict, he started to cut Russian gas supplies to the EU as early as 2021, despite ongoing long-term contracts with European companies. This tactic intensified into a form of economic blackmail following February 24th. (EEAS, 2023) The vulnerability of the EU's energy supply to Russian imports lay at the heart of the Commission's response. From Borrell's perspective, the EU needed swiftly to reduce its immediate reliance on Russian energy resources; in the medium term, it requires a radical, possibly final shift from fossil fuels towards sustainable energy sources. Whilst designed largely by the Commission, REPowerEU arguably becomes Borrell's chief policy by which to construct the first principles of EU strategic autonomy within the area of energy security. Acting as the main EU spokesman in articulating REPowerEU's energy security merits and then championing the policy as a key form of EU foreign policy vis-à-vis Russia, REPowerEU provided Borrell with a degree of personal 'leaderisation' as HR/VP. The European Commission's REPowerEU plan, socialised and championed by HR/VP Josep Borrell, rendered energy security a central, indeed explicit, component of the EU's foreign policy, as well as a key part of its policy responses to Russia after its illegal invasion of Ukraine in 2022. REPowerEU aims to end EU reliance on Russian gas in three key ways: securing alternative fossil fuel supplies, enhancing the EU's domestic energy efficiency and accelerating the deployment of EU renewable energy, the latter two at industrial scales. In this way, REPowerEU aligns with, and may well catalyse, the EU's most long-standing energy security goals by combining energy savings, clean energy production and the ultimate ambition of diversified, less vulnerable energy supplies (European Commission, 2022). In acting on behalf of the Commission as the architect of REPowerEU and the EEAS itself, over which he presides, Borrell has been the most diligent and public advocate for REPowerEU. The context for Borrell's support for the policy was made clear within days of the invasion, in which he argued that 'we will not abandon the defence of human rights and freedom because we are dependent on Russian gas', neatly tying together the EU's normative commitment to human rights and freedom and the strategic opportunity to deploy energy security as a tool by which to counter Russian aggression in Ukraine. REPowerEU enhanced Borrell's role as HR/VP by centralising energy security within EU strategic autonomy and foreign policy. First, it allowed Borrell to navigate the EU energy policy landscape amidst geopolitical tensions, beyond his usual remit. Second, the EU Energy Platform, a collective purchasing mechanism for gas and hydrogen, enabled him to assert the EU's emerging 'energy actorness' in international negotiations. Third, like Mogherini with the 2016 EUGS, REPowerEU provided Borrell with opportunities to showcase the policy, enhancing his 'leaderisation' capacities. However, Borrell's activities as HR/VP should be approached cautiously. His prolific blogs, op-eds and publications, whilst demonstrating leaderisation and affiliation with policies like REPowerEU, reflect his personal perspective rather than the EU's collective stance. These blogs blur official and unofficial formats and should be regarded as such in terms of leaderisation. There have been significant geostrategic adjustments in the EU's approach to China, especially following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Borrell has actively expressed his views on these geopolitical shifts, framing them within the broader East–West dynamics. In an address to the European Parliament on 19 April 2023, for example, Borrell highlighted the diverse interests of EU member states towards China and the profound importance of aligning these with EU treaties EU External Action (EUEA), 2023. In the last year of his tenure, Borrell began to frequently ally 'economic security' with 'national security', suggesting a co-designed, possibly more holistic approach to EU foreign policy, overlaid with his traditional demands for a unified EU stance in approaching systemic rivals, including Russia and China. During this same speech to the European Parliament, Borrell outlined the areas that concerned him most, including values, economic security, Taiwan and Ukraine, and was stark in his criticism of China's stance on fundamental freedoms, highlighting the growing economic asymmetry between the EU and China. In response, Borrell advocated for 'de-risking' strategies similar to those that make up the approach of the REPowerEU energy security, including diversifying EU strategic supplies and reconfiguring value chains to reduce vulnerabilities. Borrell stressed that EU–China relations could not progress unless China itself influenced Russia more effectively to cease its aggression in Ukraine, declaring that neutrality in this conflict equates to siding with the aggressor (CommonSpace, 2023). Despite the systemic challenges represented by China, Borrell also acknowledged China's crucial role in global issues like climate change and debt resolution, maintained the need for continued dialogue and adopted the tone typical of EU HR/VPs in stressing the need for a unified EU stance to maintain effective communication with China. Relations, however, remain tense. In October 2023, the European Commission (2023) launched an anti-subsidy investigation into Chinese electric vehicle imports to protect EU manufacturers from unfair trade practices; geopolitical tensions remain high as well, with no clear end to the conflict in Ukraine. The EU's responses to the Gaza conflict during Borrell's term were more contested and demonstrated the challenges of maintaining a unified stance amidst diverse member state interests and perspectives. Whilst the EU consistently advocated for peace and the protection of civilian lives, its responses were often seen as reactive rather than proactive. The complexity of the conflict, coupled with differing views within the EU on the approach to Israel and Palestine, led to a perception of a fragmented strategy. This case demonstrates the difficulties in integrating member states' policies into a cohesive foreign policy stance in conflicts with deeply entrenched geopolitical and historical dimensions. This contestation was not only in evidence between member states but also within the Commission itself, leading to very real tensions between Borrell and von der Leyen, as Commission President. On 13 October 2023, President von der Leyen visited Israel in response to Hamas' terrorist attack on civilians on 7 October 2023, expressing solidarity with the victims. However, her gesture sparked controversy amongst some European diplomats, who felt that she had conspicuously failed to convey their demands for Israel to adhere to international law in Gaza, as well as 'neglecting to mention the two-state solution that is a core part of the position of European countries' (Barigazzi and Sorgi, 2023). This in turn led to a rift in European diplomatic circles, including disagreements between von der Leyen and the EU's top diplomat in foreign relations, including Borrell, leaving EU member states themselves uncertain as to the mode and effectiveness of EU representation towards the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Making unilateral foreign policy statements on behalf of the EU is a high-stakes game, even when statements are meticulously prepared and agreed upon between institutions and member states. Failing to gain the necessary consensus looks high-handed at best and could have profound negative impacts at worst, as evidenced by the fallout of von der Leyen's visit to Israel on 13 October (Malingre, 2023). For the HR/VP, such rifts produce two opportunities: to heal the divide and form a united front or to continue the issue by highlighting it publicly. On this occasion, Borrell openly criticised von der Leyen, stating that she was not entitled to represent the EU's views on foreign policy, which are carefully co-ordinated between member countries and decided by the leaders of the EU's 27 countries at international summits and 'discussed by foreign ministers in meetings chaired by me Borrel' (Vinocur et al., 2023). On Monday, 23 October 2023, Borrell himself led a meeting of the EU's foreign ministers in Luxembourg to address the ongoing conflict in Gaza. At a press conference following the meeting, Borrell discussed the consensus amongst the ministers on the need for a humanitarian pause in Gaza to facilitate the safe delivery of aid amidst the conflict. He emphasised that such a pause should not be confused with a ceasefire and noted that the final decision on the EU's stance would be made at the upcoming summit in Brussels. Despite these discussions, the foreign ministers were unable to agree on a draft text recommending a 'humanitarian pause', leaving the situation unresolved as Israeli airstrikes continued in the besieged territory and Borrell himself facing the same problem as von der Leyen: lack of consensus (Barigazzi, 2023). Irony takes a little time to arise in foreign policy. In November 2023, a senior official from the EEAS was compelled to explain to member states precisely why Borrell himself had claimed that there was consensus amongst EU countries, when – according to three EU diplomats speaking on condition of anonymity – this did not appear to be the case (Moens and Barigazzi, 2024). Tensions surrounding Borrell's apparently unilateral approach to making EU declarations have included both individual interactions with Commission President von der Leyen and EU leaders themselves. During the EU summit in March 2024, for example, a private, heated discussion unfolded between German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Austrian Chancellor Karl Nehammer and Borrell himself. Despite publicly supporting a call for a ceasefire, the leaders of Germany and Austria sharply rebuked Borrell, particularly over his prolonged and vocal criticism of Israel amidst escalating casualties in Gaza. As with von der Leyen, they emphatically stated that Borrell did not represent their countries' positions on the matter (Moens and Barigazzi, 2024). The Israel–Gaza situation highlights not only the challenging two-level nature of the HR/VP position in successfully constructing an agreed EU position supported by institutional and member state leaders but also the double-edged sword that this format represents. HR/VPs are, on the one hand, expected to demonstrate finesse in obtaining the unified position of the EU pursuant to a given crisis, but also to show leadership in speaking for the EU, where a degree of personal content may also be reflected. HR/VP Borrell has produced both, with varying degrees of success and failure. There have been instances of clear and helpful articulation of EU preferences by Borrell that, in the case of REPowerEU and, to a lesser degree, the Strategic Compass, have moved the conversation forward. There are also examples where Borrell has used his own voice and indeed his own opinions in promulgating official EU views, leading to internal tensions and confusion amongst external global. The risk is that Borrell's preferred approach to HR/VP is inevitably associated with criticism of the wider EU polity itself. When it goes well, as with REPowerEU, both sides amass diplomatic credentials. When it goes poorly, as with the confusion and perceived inaction of the EU regarding the Israel–Gaza crisis, legacies themselves are at stake, a point made by Nathalie Tocci, a former political advisor for Mogherini. Tocci (2024) argues that EU preferences for 'excessive caution and restraint' risk 'abdicating on foreign policy altogether' in the long term, citing as a possible early example the EU's recurrent sidestepping of leadership obligations in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The period of 2019–2024 has been a defining era in world politics, marking significant challenges and turning points for EU integration. Under the leadership of Ursula von der Leyen, with Josep Borrell handling external relations as mandated by the EU Council, the EU navigated both well and awkwardly through these turbulent times, emerging with both valuable lessons learned from various crises and underdeveloped diplomatic mechanisms still hampering the EU's ability to play its full geopolitical, even global, role. Borrell has operated strategically in some areas, cultivating policies like REPowerEU by which to promote himself and project EU actorness in global politics whilst underplaying opportunities to push the EU towards strategic autonomy in other areas, including the Strategic Compass. As explored, there are a number of 'voices' that Borrell chooses to employ: some personal, some professional, some reactive and some representative; the majority have been in the service of a united common foreign policy for the EU in areas, possibly most articulate in those areas where his own views align propitiously with those of key member states. In more contentious domains, Borrell has tended to default to his own opinions and then run retrospective interference to marshal a common stance amongst EU members. Whether the succeeding HR/VP will cultivate a similar approach and the impact this has on forging EU foreign affairs amidst global turbulence remains to be seen. The authors have nothing to report.