Analysis of the Destruction of Ukrainian Nuclear Fuel Cycle Energy Facilities as a Result of Russian Military Operations

Problem statement. Due to Russia's ongoing terrorist attacks on Ukraine's energy facilities, the energy system was damaged, resulting in blackouts and rolling blackouts across the country. The destruction of power capacities resulted in the unstable operation of certain critical infrastructure units for electricity generation at thermal, nuclear and hydroelectric power plants and the introduction of forced hourly blackout schedules. Seizure of the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant, occupation and full control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and the Zaporizhzhia Thermal Power Plant (TPP). Complete destruction of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power station (HPP), partial destruction of the Dnipro HPP, Dniester HPP and Kaniv HPP. During the hostilities, Kryvyi Rih and Prydniprovia TPPs were damaged, Luhansk TPP (90–100 %), Vuhlehirsk TPP (90–100 %), Zmiiv TPP (up to 90 %) were completely destroyed, Burshtyn TPP (80–90 %) and Ladyzhyn TPP (70–95 %) were almost completely destroyed. The purpose of the article is to identify and analyse the damage to Ukrainian TPPs, HPPs and NPPs caused by the Russian military actions against Ukraine and to determine possible consequences for the nuclear fuel cycle of our country and possible prospects for the transition to new nuclear reactors of European and global fuel cell manufacturers, to improve equipment and stabilise the energy market in the context of military operations. Conclusion. In the course of the analysis of potential hazards at radiation hazardous facilities (RHF) in Ukraine, it was determined that the main threat is accidents at RHF with release of radiation into the atmosphere, lithosphere and hydrosphere. In the light of recent events regarding the military seizure of the Chornobyl NPP and Zaporizhzhya NPP, measurements using standard methods of research, screening and monitoring are not possible, and access of IAEA representatives is limited, which is why the latest measurement methods should be used with the use of autonomous remote-controlled ground, surface and air drones in automatic object or sample measurement of radiation parameters at RNS. It is the use of autonomous vehicles (drones) that is currently the most pressing issue of radiation safety not only in the nuclear power industry but also in the entire nuclear fuel cycle as part of the environmental safety of Ukraine. In case of seizure of a nuclear facility or limited access to it, research methods should be changed. If the facility is partially seized or access is available, then express methods of radiation contamination registration or sampling can be used and the method of laboratory research can be used in the future. However, if a nuclear power plant or a facility that is part of the nuclear fuel cycle of Ukraine is captured and access to it is impossible, then only methods of remote measurement of the radiation situation at and around nuclear facilities using ground and airborne autonomous vehicles remain. For further research, it is necessary to identify technical possibilities for using Ukraine's own mineral resources and switching from Soviet RBMK-1000, VVER-440 and VVER-1000 reactors with fuel elements supplied to us from the Russian Federation to newer types of European and American reactors with appropriate fuel elements.