Does the Constitution protect the ability of an Australian to enter the country? This article investigates that question. Whilst the Constitution provides no express guarantee of a citizen’s right to enter Australia, a series of recent cases — particularly Love v Commonwealth 1 and Alexander v Minister for Home Affairs 2 — give occasion to consider whether a freedom of entry forms an implied part of Australia’s constitutional framework. Early scholarly attempts to establish a freedom of entry have relied upon the definition of non-alienage to ground this implication. This article commences by reviewing the effect of the High Court’s recent alienage jurisprudence on these arguments. After concluding that fatal difficulties attend this approach, I investigate an alternative foundation for an implied freedom of entry: an implication drawn from a constitutional principle of popular sovereignty. Focusing on a recent thread of High Court jurisprudence which has placed an increasing emphasis on the constitutional protection afforded to popular sovereignty, I conclude that this alternative basis provides a viable foundation upon which an implied freedom of entry could be recognised in the Constitution.
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Benjamin Durkin (2024) studied this question.
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